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THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF VOTING
RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
Franita Tolson *
Abstract: Scholars and courts have hotly debated whether the preclearance regime of the
Voting Rights Act is constitutional under the Reconstruction Amendments. In answering this
question, this Article is the first to consider the effect of section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment on the scope of Congress’s enforcement authority. Section 2 allows Congress to
reduce the size of a state’s delegation in the House of Representatives if the state abridges the
right to vote in state and federal elections for any reason, “except for participation in
rebellion, or other crime.” This Article contends that section 2 influences the scope of
congressional authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which gives Congress
the power to enforce the amendment through appropriate legislation. Section 2—with its low
threshold for violations (i.e., abridgment on almost any grounds) that trigger a relatively
extreme penalty (reduced representation)—illustrates the proper means-ends fit for
congressional legislation passed pursuant to section 5 to address voting rights violations.
Renewed focus on section 2 also sheds light on the textual and historical links between the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, links that provide a broad basis for Congress to
regulate state and federal elections. Contrary to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Shelby County v. Holder, this Article concludes that requiring preclearance of all electoral
changes instituted by select jurisdictions under the Voting Rights Act is actually a lesser
penalty than reduced representation under section 2, and thus is consistent with Congress’s
broad authority to regulate voting and elections under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments.
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INTRODUCTION
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA or the Act) is one of the most
important pieces of civil rights legislation ever enacted, reflecting
Congress’s expansive authority to regulate state and federal elections
post-Reconstruction. 1 The Act is responsible for eradicating much of the
discrimination in voting that had long relegated minorities to secondclass citizenship. In 2009, the Supreme Court declined to resolve a
constitutional challenge to section 5 of the Act, 2 which requires certain
covered states and jurisdictions to preclear all changes to their election

1. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2006)).
2. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 557 U.S. 193, 197 (2009).
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laws with the federal government before the changes can go into effect.3
But just four years later, in Shelby County v. Holder, 4 the Court
invalidated the VRA’s coverage formula in section 4(b), essentially
rendering section 5 void by eliminating the mechanism through which
coverage under the preclearance regime is determined. 5 The Court held
that the coverage formula intrudes on the Constitution’s principle of
“equal sovereignty” by subjecting certain states to the preclearance
requirement based on “decades old data and eradicated practices.”6
However, in invalidating the coverage formula, the Court failed to
address precisely why Congress had the authority to reauthorize section
5 but not section 4(b), 7 despite being vocal in 2009 that section 5 could
impermissibly intrude on state sovereignty. 8
The Court may have avoided this question because it was playing
politics in striking down the coverage formula but not the preclearance
provision, 9 placing the onus on a gridlocked Congress to develop a new
trigger. Or perhaps the Court was trying to be more precise in
identifying the provision of the VRA that was actually of constitutional
concern. 10 In reality, the doctrinal confusion in Shelby County persists
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a).
4. __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
5. Id. at 2631 (stating that the “formula is an initial prerequisite to a determination that
exceptional conditions still exist justifying [section 5’s] ‘extraordinary departure from the traditional
course of relations between the States and the Federal Government’” (quoting Presley v. Etowah
Cnty. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 500–01 (1992))).
6. Id. at 2624, 2627.
7. See id. at 2627, 2631. The Court says that Congress “may draft another formula based on
current conditions,” id. at 2631, a statement that appears to reluctantly concede the constitutionality
of section 5, at least for the time being. But it is clear that the Court may take a different view of
section 5’s constitutionality if faced with this issue in the future. See id. at 2625 (noting that Shelby
County’s arguments that “the preclearance requirement, even without regard to its disparate
coverage, is now unconstitutional . . . have a good deal of force”); id. at 2632 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“While the Court claims to ‘issue no holding on § 5 itself,’ its own opinion
compellingly demonstrates that Congress has failed to justify ‘current burdens’ with a record
demonstrating ‘current needs.’” (quoting id. at 2622, 2631 (majority opinion))).
8. See NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193, 202–03 (2009) (avoiding the constitutional question but
suggesting that section 5 is potentially unconstitutional on federalism grounds). Whether section 5
actually intrudes on state sovereignty, broadly defined, is contestable. As I have argued previously,
states retain only limited sovereignty over elections after the adoption of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. See Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalism as a Constraint
on the Voting Rights Act, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1195 (2012).
9. See Richard L. Hasen, The Chief Justice’s Long Game, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/opinion/the-chief-justices-long-game.html.
10. See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2627 (noting the potential constitutional problems with section
5 but invalidating section 4(b) because “[t]he provisions of § 5 only apply to those jurisdictions
singled out by § 4”).
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because neither the Court nor the legal scholarship has a clear sense of
the scope of congressional authority over elections. 11 This inconsistency
in the doctrine is problematic because challenges to the constitutionality
of preclearance as a remedy to address voting rights violations are still
on the horizon given that there are currently lawsuits to “bail in”
jurisdictions for preclearance using the “pocket trigger” of section 3(c)
of the VRA. 12 Instead of providing clarity on these issues, however,
Shelby County does little to resolve the tension between Congress’s
authority to protect voting rights and the states’ sovereignty over
elections. 13
This tension between the states and the federal government exists
because the states have the primary responsibility of crafting the laws
that govern state and federal elections. The U.S. Constitution allows
states to choose the “Times, Places and Manner” of federal elections,14
11. Indeed, a nontrivial amount of the post-Shelby County coverage has focused on the Court’s
argument that section 4(b) violates the equal-sovereignty principle. See, e.g., Eric Posner, John
Roberts’ Opinion on the Voting Rights Act is Really Lame, SLATE (June 25, 2013, 1:44 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2013/supreme_court_
2013/supreme_court_on_the_voting_rights_act_chief_justice_john_roberts_struck.html;
Nina
Totenberg, Whose Term Was It? A Look Back at the Supreme Court Term, NPR (July 5, 2013, 3:35
AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/07/05/198708325/whose-term-was-it-a-look-back-at-the-supremecourt. Even if Congress updates the formula to address this concern about treating the sovereign
states differently, this would not address the potential federalism problems presented by the
preclearance regime itself. NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 203.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2006) (authorizing federal courts to place jurisdictions that have
violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments into preclearance); see also Adam Liptak &
Charlie Savage, U.S. Asks Court to Limit Texas on Ballot Rules, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/26/us/holder-wants-texas-to-clear-voting-changes-with-theus.html.
13. Although they are the most controversial, sections 4(b) and 5 of the VRA are not the only
voting-rights provisions that Congress has enacted that implicate matters of state sovereignty. See,
e.g., Kevin K. Green, A Vote Properly Cast? The Constitutionality of the National Voter
Registration Act of 1993, 22 J. LEGIS. 45, 82 (1996) (noting that the National Voter Registration Act
“in some ways does impinge upon state sovereignty”); Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and
Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and Remedies after Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 728–29
(1998) (assessing whether section 2 of the VRA is an appropriate use of congressional authority);
Michael E. Waterstone, Lane, Fundamental Rights, and Voting, 56 ALA. L. REV. 793 (2005)
(discussing whether the Help America Vote Act can be amended to include a private cause of action
against the states without violating principles of federalism). Indeed, the Supreme Court decided a
case this term holding that the National Voter Registration Act preempts portions of Arizona’s
voter-identification law. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct.
2247, 2260 (2013). Thus, the analysis presented herein sheds light on the constitutionality of various
federal election laws, not just section 5.
14. The Elections Clause provides: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing
Senators.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
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which, in conjunction with the states’ power under the Tenth
Amendment, 15 amounts to a plenary authority to structure and design
elections at every level. Nonetheless, this allocation of authority is
premised on the assumption that the states will act in good faith. The
Framers initially worried that unfettered state control over elections
could lead to the Union’s destruction, 16 and later, that the states would
use their control over voter qualifications to disenfranchise large
portions of their population for illegitimate reasons. 17
It is this latter concern that prompted the passage of the VRA after
Congress developed an extensive evidentiary record showing that racial
discrimination in voting was widespread in certain jurisdictions and
impervious to case-by-case litigation. 18 Preclearance under section 5
therefore ensures that any changes to election laws within these
jurisdictions “neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying
or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.” 19 Critics
argue that section 5 infringes on state sovereignty because minority voter
registration and turnout in jurisdictions singled out for coverage through
the trigger of section 4(b) parallel that of noncovered jurisdictions, 20 and
the very act of preclearance requires the affected areas to submit all
changes for federal approval, including those regulations that govern
state elections having few, if any, federal implications.21
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”).
16. THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, at 363 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“Nothing
can be more evident than that an exclusive power of regulating elections for the national
government, in the hands of the State legislatures, would leave the existence of the Union entirely at
their mercy. They could at any moment annihilate it by neglecting to provide for the choice of
persons to administer its affairs.”).
17. See infra Part II.
18. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315–16 (1966).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006).
20. Section 4(b) of the Act imposed section 5’s preclearance regime on those jurisdictions that
used a test or device as a prerequisite to voting as of November 1964, and had less than fifty percent
voter registration or turnout in the 1964 Presidential election. Id. § 1973b(b). In 1970, the coverage
formula was extended to those jurisdictions that maintained a test or device as of November 1, 1968
and had less than fifty percent turnout or registration in the 1968 presidential election. Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314, 315. Congress later extended
section 5 to states that discriminated against language minorities. Voting Rights Act Amendments
of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400, 401. Nine states—mostly in the deep South, along with a
few jurisdictions scattered throughout several other states—were covered by section 5. Jurisdictions
Previously Covered by Section 5, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/
crt/about/vot/sec_5/covered.php (last visited Apr. 22, 2014).
21. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2624 (2013) (“States must beseech
the Federal Government for permission to implement laws that they would otherwise have the right
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This Article argues that these criticisms cannot be squared with the
structure of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, which, when
read together, strongly support the constitutionality of the VRA’s
preclearance regime in its entirety. 22 The Amendments, which govern
the same subject (voting) and share a drafting history, have textual and
historical connections that are the basis for broad federal authority to
regulate state elections, authority that is sufficient to overcome any
disquietude about disturbing the sovereignty that states retain. 23 In
particular, the extreme penalty in section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 24 which allows Congress to reduce a state’s delegation in
the House of Representatives for abridging the right to vote in both state
and federal elections for reasons not limited to race discrimination,
influences the scope of penalties that Congress can impose pursuant to
its enforcement authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth

to enact and execute on their own . . . .”); NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193, 202 (2009) (expressing
similar concerns). When I refer to regulations that affect only state elections, it does not matter if a
state adopts the same regulation for both state and federal elections. Conceivably, preclearance of
the regulation could be constitutional as it applies to federal elections and unconstitutional as it
applies to state elections. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 130–31 (1970) (invalidating
minimum-age requirement as it applies to state and local, but not federal, elections), superseded by
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
22. The Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to vote as a fundamental interest, Harper v. Va.
State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); see also Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1
(2006)) (passed under the Fourteenth Amendment), and the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits
abridging the right to vote on the basis of race, U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1; see also Voting Rights
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to
1973bb-1 (2006)) (passed under the Fifteenth Amendment).
23. My interpretive approach here is a variation of Akhil Amar’s theory of intratextualism, in
which he compares the operative terms of a specific clause of the Constitution with other clauses
that employ the same or similar language. Akhil Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747,
791–92 (1999). Similarly, John Hart Ely looks to the broader themes in the Constitution to interpret
specific clauses. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). This Article
loosely adopts these techniques through its reading of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
See infra Part II.B.1; see also Tolson, supra note 8 (applying a variation of intratextualism to
interpret the Elections Clause and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments).
24. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But
when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President
of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a
State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way
abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to
the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
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Amendments. 25 The legislative debates in 1866 over the language of
section 2 demonstrate that Congress viewed its enforcement authority
over voting and elections broadly, although its intent was not to
completely displace state sovereignty in this area. 26 Section 2, which
strikes a balance between protecting the franchise and respecting state
sovereignty, illustrates the proper means-ends fit for federal voting rights
legislation. 27 Because of concerns that states will circumvent the
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment through their authority over
elections, 28 this provision sets a very low threshold for violations to
trigger federal action (abridgment on almost any grounds) while giving
Congress substantial authority to impose an extreme penalty to remedy
such violations. Therefore, lesser penalties, like the preclearance regime
imposed on certain jurisdictions by sections 4(b) and 5 of the VRA, are
an “appropriate” means of protecting the right to vote because such
remedies are less intrusive of state sovereignty than reduced
representation under section 2. 29
There is no body of literature discussing section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and its effect on Congress’s enforcement authority to
regulate elections. This absence is even more glaring in scholarly
debates over whether the VRA is consistent with the congruence-andproportionality standard of City of Boerne v. Flores, 30 which is the test
that courts use to assess the constitutionality of legislation passed

25. There is a clear textual link between sections 2 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because
“Congress’ power under § 5 . . . extends . . . to ‘enforc[ing]’ the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment,” which, by its terms, includes section 2. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519
(1997) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5)). However, this Article argues that the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments should be read together, which means that section 2 also influences the
scope of penalties that can be adopted pursuant to the enforcement clause of section 2 of the
Fifteenth Amendment. See infra Part II.B.2 (viewing the Enforcement Act of 1870 as a product of
section 2’s influence on the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments).
26. See infra Part II.
27. See infra Part II.
28. I refer to this as an “anti-circumvention” norm that is implicit in section 2. See infra Part I.B.
The norm is also prominent in the Court’s case law. See infra Part III.
29. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Lawfulness of Section 5—and Thus of Section 5, 126 HARV. L.
REV. F. 109 (2013) (arguing that if section 5 of the VRA is unconstitutional then section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment is also unconstitutional, as it was adopted pursuant to a mechanism that
used selective preclearance like that imposed by the VRA by excluding southern states from
deliberating on its terms); Michael Halberstam, The Myth of “Conquered Provinces”: Probing the
Extent of the VRA’s Encroachment on State and Local Autonomy, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 923, 948
(2011) (arguing that under the VRA, states retain decision-making authority over the design of
elections, and, so long as their choices are nondiscriminatory, do not receive any substantive federal
input).
30. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).

09 - Tolson Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

6/6/2014 10:59 AM

386

[Vol. 89:379

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 31 Instead, the legal
scholarship and the courts have narrowly focused on the relationship
between the substantive protections of section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the enforcement provision of section 5 in determining
the scope of congressional authority. 32 As a result, debates over whether
the Voting Rights Act is constitutional miss the key insight that any
interpretation of congressional authority over voting and elections
should be assessed by reading the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
together, with renewed emphasis on section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 33
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of
Supreme Court precedent regarding Congress’s power to enforce the
mandates of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, highlighting the
difficulty of applying the congruence-and-proportionality standard to
Congress’s authority over elections. The fit that the standard requires for
congressional legislation to address particular harms generally has been
contextual, 34 and if applied to voting rights legislation, application of the
31. Id. at 508 (applying the congruence-and-proportionality standard to invalidate the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as it applies to the states). It is not clear, after Shelby County, if
the congruence-and-proportionality test also applies to the Fifteenth Amendment. For discussion in
the legal scholarship regarding the standard, see, for example, Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate”
Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1132 (2001); Luke P.
McLoughlin, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and City of Boerne: The Continuity, Proximity, and
Trajectory of Vote-Dilution Standards, 31 VT. L. REV. 39, 47–48 (2006); Daniel P. Tokaji, Intent
and Its Alternatives: Defending the New Voting Rights Act, 58 ALA. L. REV. 349 (2006); Gabriel J.
Chin, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and the ‘Aggregate Powers’ of Congress over Elections
(UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 313, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2132158.
32. See, e.g., Robert J. Kaczorowski, Congress’s Power to Enforce Fourteenth Amendment
Rights: Lessons from Federal Remedies the Framers Enacted, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187 (2005);
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric
Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003).
33. Recognizing that application of the congruence-and-proportionality standard could invalidate
the VRA, some scholars have attempted to outline an alternative basis of constitutionality for
section 5. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions
of the Voting Rights Act after Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 204–06 (2005) (arguing that
congressional authority to enact section 5 could potentially derive from the Guarantee Clause);
Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power to Amend and Extend the Voting Rights
Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 13–16 (2007). But in advocating for the constitutionality of preclearance,
none of these scholars adequately account for the fact that congressional power is at its lowest ebb
when regulating state elections and when prohibiting conduct that lacks a discriminatory purpose.
See Tolson, supra note 8.
34. Compare Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737 (2003) (upholding the
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) under the congruence-and-proportionality standard because
it involved a gender-based classification), with Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,
373–74 (2001) (invalidating portions of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) because
disability discrimination is assessed under rational-basis review).
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standard has to be consistent with section 2 and the structure of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Part II illustrates that this
structural reading of the Amendments is justified through a discussion of
the legislative debates surrounding the adoption of section 2 and
Congress’s enactment of the Enforcement Act of 1870, one of the
earliest pieces of voting-rights legislation. 35 Section 2’s influence on
Congress’s enforcement authority extends beyond the penalty of reduced
representation to imposing lesser penalties, like the Enforcement Act,
which protected African-Americans from being disenfranchised at the
state level through direct and indirect means. 36 Part III assesses the
constitutionality of the VRA in light of these considerations, concluding
that, contrary to the recent decision of Shelby County, the preclearance
regime is constitutional.
I.

CONGRUENCE, PROPORTIONALITY, AND THE
INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORK OF SECTION 2 OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

In Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court invalidated the
coverage formula of section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, but provided
little guidance regarding the appropriate standard of review for assessing
the constitutionality of voting-rights legislation under the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. 37 The Court relegated its discussion of the
Fourteenth Amendment to a mere footnote with little explanation of how
either Amendment resolves the constitutional issues present in the

35. Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, invalidated by United States v. Reese, 92
U.S. 214, 219–22 (1875). Originally passed pursuant to the Fifteenth Amendment, the Enforcement
Act of 1870 required that all citizens be able to vote “at any election by the people in any State,”
making no distinction between state and federal elections. Id. at 140. Section 4 of the Act imposed a
criminal penalty on “any person [who] by . . . unlawful means, shall hinder, delay, prevent, or
obstruct . . . any citizen from doing any act required to be done to qualify him to vote or from voting
at any election,” but it imposed this penalty without any requirement that the vote denial be based
on race. Id. at 141.
36. See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION (Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Morris
eds., 1988) (discussing the challenges faced by ex-slaves in gaining political and civil rights during
Reconstruction).
37. In its grant of certiorari, the Court acknowledged that the preclearance regime is based on dual
sources of constitutional authority:
Whether Congress’ decision in 2006 to reauthorize Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act under
the pre-existing coverage formula of Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act exceeded its
authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and thus violated the Tenth
Amendment and Article IV of the United States Constitution.
Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 594, 594 (2012) (order granting petition for a writ of
certiorari).
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case. 38 Instead, the Court contended that section 4(b) failed both
rational-basis review39 and the standard of review derived from its
decision in NAMUDNO, which “guides [its] review under both [the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth] Amendments.” 40 The latter statement is the
most perplexing given that NAMUDNO did not articulate a standard of
review under these provisions. 41 Nevertheless, the Shelby County
Court’s obscure and vague pronouncements left a clear opening for later
assertions that the more exacting congruence-and-proportionality test
applies to legislation passed pursuant to the Fifteenth Amendment. 42
Shelby County provides little hope that this more-restrictive test will
not apply if litigants challenge other provisions of the VRA including
section 3(c), section 5, or even section 2 of the Act. 43 Strict application
of the congruence-and-proportionality standard is incompatible with
protecting voting rights under either the Fourteenth or the Fifteenth
Amendments. America’s decentralized system of elections gives states
substantial legislative discretion to engage in acts that might otherwise
infringe the fundamental right to vote and disadvantage racial minorities,
complicating the means-ends analysis applied to voting rights legislation
designed to address these harms. 44 Since section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment gives Congress substantial authority to legislate in this area,
the congruence-and-proportionality standard has to be interpreted in
light of this provision.

38. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2622 n.1 (2013).
39. See id. at 2629–30. But see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327 (1966)
(applying this standard to assess section 5 of the VRA).
40. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2622 n.1.
41. See NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009) (“The parties do not agree on the standard to
apply in deciding whether, in light of the foregoing concerns, Congress exceeded its Fifteenth
Amendment enforcement power in extending the preclearance requirements . . . . That question has
been extensively briefed in this case, but we need not resolve it. The Act’s preclearance
requirements and its coverage formula raise serious constitutional questions under either [the
congruent-and-proportional or rational-basis] test.”).
42. See Richard Hasen, The Curious Disappearance of Boerne and the Future Jurisprudence of
Voting Rights and Race, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2013, 7:10 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2013/06/the-curious-disappearance-of-boerne-and-the-future-jurisprudence-of-voting-rights-andrace/.
43. Section 2 forbids any “qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure” that has
“the purpose [or] effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color” and,
unlike section 5, applies nationwide. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2006).
44. Karlan, supra note 33, at 10–12.
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Reevaluating the Congruence and Proportionality Standard in the
Context of Voting and Elections

In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court changed its standard from the
more permissive rational-basis review outlined in cases like South
Carolina v. Katzenbach 45 to the congruence-and-proportionality test,
which requires that Congress establish a record of constitutional
violations before it can legislate a remedy pursuant to section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 46 At least initially, the Court held that the VRA
passed muster under the more-rigorous standard. Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority in City of Boerne, noted that the Act was
“confined to those regions of the country where voting discrimination
had been most flagrant and affected a discrete class of state laws,”47
which ensured that it is the type of “[r]emedial legislation under
[section] 5 . . . ‘adapted to the mischief and wrong which the
[Fourteenth] [A]mendment was intended to provide against.’” 48 Despite
this language, however, the quantum of proof that Congress must amass
to show that legislation is “appropriate” is inconsistent with more
deferential pre-City of Boerne precedent, posing a problem for all federal
voting-rights legislation.
The place of disagreement between Katzenbach’s broad view of
congressional authority and Shelby County’s more narrow approach goes
to the question of fit—Katzenbach took a very liberal view of how well
the remedy has to fit the wrong to be addressed. 49 In contrast, the
congruence-and-proportionality standard requires a much tighter fit, but
45. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
46. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519–20 (1997). To determine whether there is a fit
between the remedy imposed by Congress and the evil to be addressed, the Court will “identify with
some precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue,” and then the Court will “examine
whether Congress identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional . . . discrimination.” Bd. of
Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365, 368 (2001).
47. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532–33 (citation omitted).
48. Id. at 532 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883) (alteration in original)).
49. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court noted:
By adding this authorization [in section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment], the Framers indicated
that Congress was to be chiefly responsible for implementing the rights created in
§ 1 . . . . Accordingly, in addition to the courts, Congress has full remedial powers to effectuate
the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination in voting.
383 U.S. at 325–26. Remedial does not, in the eyes of the City of Boerne Court, mean that Congress
has the authority to decree the substance of rights; rather, Congress can only enforce them, which is
why the Court requires a record of constitutional violations to support Congress’s exercise of this
authority. See Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing Representation: Congressional Power to Enforce the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2341,
2363–67 (2003).
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the nature of voting rights makes it difficult for the Court, with its
limited fact-finding ability, to have the sole responsibility of resolving
issues of fit. Notably, the Court has never found a civil-rights law
unconstitutional based on facts external to the congressional record. 50
For example, in Lassiter v. Northampton County, 51 the Court held that
requiring prospective voters to take literacy tests as a prerequisite for
voting was not a per se violation of the Constitution because the tests
were reasonably related to exercising the franchise. 52 However, the
Court later upheld Congress’s decision to ban literacy tests because
Congress developed an evidentiary record illustrating that such tests
were being used in a discriminatory manner. 53
In the years since City of Boerne, however, the Court has been
decidedly less deferential to Congress in its decision to reauthorize the
preclearance regime of the Voting Rights Act. 54 Given this precedent, it
is not surprising that there is anxiety among legal scholars about the
constitutionality of preclearance as a remedy going forward. 55 Coverage
formula aside, the Court did not directly address Shelby County’s
argument that preclearance is justified only if the congressional record
shows that racial discrimination is as rampant now as it was in 1965,
when Congress first passed the Act. 56
50. See Mark A. Posner, Time Is Still on Its Side: Why Congressional Reauthorization of Section
5 of the Voting Rights Act Represents a Congruent and Proportional Response to Our Nation’s
History of Discrimination in Voting, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 56 (2006) (“[T]he Court
has never held that a civil rights law that was constitutional when enacted may lose its constitutional
status because of the passage of time and a change in the factual circumstances that pertain to the
law.”).
51. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
52. See id. at 51–54.
53. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 387 U.S. at 327.
54. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); NAMUDNO, 557 U.S.
193, 201 (2009).
55. See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Mapping a Post-Shelby County
Contingency Strategy, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 131 (2013) (arguing that no matter what the outcome
in Shelby County, voting-rights advocates should prepare for a future without section 5); Ellen D.
Katz, How Big is Shelby County?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2013, 6:31 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/how-big-is-shelby-county/ (“[T]he Court[] refus[ed] to defer in
any significant way to Congress’s judgment that the preclearance regime remains necessary . . . .”).
56. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 24–25, Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612 (No. 12-96). The
Court invalidated the coverage formula because of the lack of overt discrimination, but did not
resolve whether the same type of record is required in order to impose the remedy of preclearance
more generally. See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629 (noting that, with respect to the congressional
record, “no one can fairly say that it shows anything approaching the ‘pervasive,’ ‘flagrant,’
‘widespread,’ and ‘rampant’ discrimination that faced Congress in 1965” (quoting NAMUDNO, 557
U.S. at 201; Katzenbach, 387 U.S. at 308, 315, 331)). Much of the evidence of discrimination
amassed by Congress in 2006 is based on violations of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and
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Section 5 of the VRA operates to block unconstitutional conduct ex
ante, so, understandably, Congress has had difficulty compiling a record
of discrimination similar to that present in prior reauthorizations.57 It is
difficult to square the reality of improved racial circumstances with
Shelby County’s suggestion that a showing of pervasive and widespread
discrimination might be required to impose the remedy of
preclearance, 58 but other precedents corroborate this position. 59 In Board
of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 60 the Court held that
the legislative history of Title I of the ADA, which prohibited disability
discrimination in public employment, did not reveal “a marked pattern
of unconstitutional action by the States.” 61 Rather, Title I represented
Congress’s “judgment that there should be a ‘comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities,’” a determination that, in the Court’s view, falls in the realm
administrative denials of preclearance by the Attorney General, neither of which requires a finding
that the jurisdiction acted with discriminatory intent. Nevertheless, there are some instances in the
legislative record of official actions taken with discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty., 133 S.
Ct. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that “between 1982 and 2006, DOJ objections blocked
over 700 voting changes based on a determination that the changes were discriminatory” and
“Congress found that the majority of DOJ objections included findings of discriminatory intent”);
Modern Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 6 (2006) (statement of Wan J. Kim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Division,
Department of Justice); id. at 21, 82 (statement of Robert McDuff, Attorney, Jackson, Mississippi).
57. Ellen D. Katz, Congressional Power to Extend Preclearance: A Response to Professor
Karlan, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 33, 53 (2007) (arguing that the standard “must be adjusted to reflect the
status of section 5 as an operational statute” designed to “target political processes that continue to
be compromised by race”); see also Hasen, supra note 33, at 179 (noting that states do not engage
in widespread discrimination because section 5 has been in effect for over forty years).
58. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2625 (noting the parity between covered and noncovered
jurisdictions in minority voter turnout and registration); NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 203–04; see also
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (striking down provisions of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) on the grounds that the evidence relied on by Congress
was too anecdotal and too narrow geographically to justify extension of the ADEA to all of the
states); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 643, 647
(1999) (accepting that state infringement of patents could violate the Fourteenth Amendment, but
invalidating the Patent Remedy Act because Congress did not show that states had been engaging in
this behavior).
59. Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1715 (2004) (“[T]he [City of Boerne] Court repeatedly distinguished the
[RFRA] from the VRA on the basis of the greater factual justification for the latter, [but] the
passage of time might bode poorly for a clear legislative finding of the continued need for section
5.”); see also Travis Crum, Note, The Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation
and Dynamic Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992 (2010) (suggesting that the pocket trigger of
section 3(c)’s bail-in provision is more congruent and proportional than section 5 because section
3(c) requires a showing of intentional discrimination).
60. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
61. Id. at 373.
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of defining constitutional rights rather than enforcing them. 62 Similarly,
the Shelby County Court insinuates that, like Title I of the ADA, section
5 is also a policy preference rather than a remedy designed to address a
specific pattern of racial discrimination in voting. 63
Nonetheless, there are many occasions—both before and after City of
Boerne—in which the Court has endorsed the congressional record
underlying the VRA, despite evidence that it is not based on the type of
record envisioned by City of Boerne and its progeny. 64 These cases
present a slightly more optimistic answer to the question of whether
preclearance can ever be a congruent-and-proportional remedy; 65 recent
applications of the standard also underscore this point. In Tennessee v.
Lane 66 and Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 67 the
Court applied a more deferential variation of the congruence-andproportionality standard because the legislation in these cases implicated
fundamental rights that the Court evaluates under heightened scrutiny. 68
62. Id. at 374.
63. See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2625 (noting that “[b]latantly discriminatory evasions of
federal decrees are rare,” “minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels,” and the “tests
and devices that blocked access to the ballot have been forbidden nationwide for over 40 years”).
64. Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999) (holding that a covered jurisdiction in a
noncovered state had to preclear all changes to their election laws, even if the change is mandated
by state law because Congress has the power to regulate nondiscretionary conduct that lacks
discriminatory intent); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 132–33 (1970) (detailing the general
evidence before Congress when it imposed the nationwide literacy test ban including “this country’s
history of discriminatory educational opportunities,” “a long history of the discriminatory use of
literacy tests,” and “statistics which demonstrate that voter registration and voter participation are
consistently greater in States without literacy tests”); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652–53
(1966) (refusing to look for specific evidence in the record justifying section 4(e) of the VRA,
which prohibits English literacy as a prerequisite for voting, and concluding that it “is enough that
we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did”); see
also Hasen, supra note 33, at 200 (reading Lopez v. Monterey County to confirm that “there was
enough evidence to support the 1982 preclearance decision,” which may support 2006 renewal);
Katz, supra note 57, at 42 (“Lopez certainly offers support for the claim that section 5 is entitled to a
different form of review than that employed in the City of Boerne cases. In Lopez, Justice O’Connor
cites City of Boerne only once, and then solely for the proposition that Congress’ enforcement
power includes the power to prohibit constitutional conduct and to intrude deeply into state
sovereign processes.”).
65. See Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. CT.
REV. 61, 90 (“Boerne nonetheless recognized that Section 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] grants
Congress a remedial ratchet power . . . to enact remedial or preventative measures for what the
Court itself would consider to be violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, even if the Court would
not itself require the specific remedial or preventative measures. That recognition was necessary to
reconcile Boerne with Morgan and other cases, and more importantly, to avoid rendering Section 5
nugatory.”).
66. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
67. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
68. Lane, 541 U.S. at 522–23 (upholding Title II of the ADA because plaintiff’s lack of access to
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Arguably, the Voting Rights Act presents a stronger case than both
Hibbs and Lane, given that it protects both a suspect class and a
fundamental interest, 69 but questions remain as to the sufficiency of the
record established by Congress since at least some of the justices are
convinced that the decline in overt discrimination makes the Act’s
intrusion on state sovereignty unprecedented and unwarranted. 70 The
Shelby County decision suggests that the Court is gravitating away from
a broad interpretation of Congress’s enforcement authority that would
allow it to regulate otherwise constitutional conduct in order to deter
constitutional violations. 71
Also problematic for the VRA is a case decided two terms ago,
Coleman v. Court of Appeals, 72 which retreated from the more lax
application of the congruence-and-proportionality standard present in
Lane and Hibbs, and suggested that the presence of a fundamental right
may not be sufficient, in and of itself, to reduce the level of scrutiny in

the courts due to disability violated the Due Process Clause and is therefore subject to “more
searching judicial review” than discrimination on the basis of disability); Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736
(holding that that the family-care leave portion of the FMLA is a congruent-and-proportional
remedy to address gender discrimination because “the standard for demonstrating the
constitutionality of a gender-based classification is more difficult to meet than [the] rational-basis
test . . . [therefore] it was easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations”);
Issacharoff, supra note 59, at 1715 (“[I]n Hibbs, the Court appeared to back off the sterner
implications of City of Boerne, indicating that it might very well carve out a protected area for
discrimination concerns along the classic frontiers of suspect classes.”).
69. The Court has yet to invalidate congressional legislation that can be justified based on
multiple grounds. See Hasen, supra note 33, at 201–02 (“A renewed preclearance provision
involves race discrimination, so strict scrutiny already applies. But it also involves the right to vote,
itself a fundamental right. The tone of the Court’s opinion in Lane . . . suggests that the Court is
willing to defer more to Congress to remedy the more that Congress seeks to protect fundamental
rights.”).
70. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 262527 (2013) (suggesting that
preclearance is unconstitutional for this reason); NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193, 203–04 (2009) (same).
71. See Coleman v. Court of Appeals, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1338 (2012) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (arguing that congressional authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
should be limited “to the regulation of conduct that itself violates the Fourteenth Amendment”
(emphasis in original)). Compare Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2626–27 (suggesting that the decline in
overt discrimination makes the preclearance regime non-remedial), with City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997) (observing that Congress may pass legislation under its enforcement
authority that prohibits acts that do not violate the Constitution in order to prevent constitutional
violations), and City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173 (1980) (same). But see Tolson,
supra note 8, at 1235 (arguing that congressional authority under the Reconstruction Amendments
is “‘no less broad than its authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause,’ capable of addressing
state action that has a discriminatory purpose, that has a discriminatory effect, and that may not
even violate the substantive provisions of the Amendments” (quoting City of Rome, 446 U.S. at
176)).
72. __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012).
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these cases. 73 Thus, the congruence-and-proportionality standard, as it
has developed in the case law, does not appear amenable to arguments
that voting-rights legislation should be treated differently from other
exercises of Congress’s enforcement authority. Voting is sui generis
because section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment embodies a textual
commitment to broad access to the franchise, a distinction that is
germane to the judicial review of voting-rights legislation passed
pursuant to section 5.
B.

“The Greater Includes the Lesser”: The Relationship Between
Sections 2 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment

The Shelby County Court purportedly assessed the constitutionality of
the VRA’s preclearance regime under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments; in reality, the Court did not properly balance these dual
justifications for congressional authority against the state’s power over
elections, especially in light of section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 74 Section 2 provides that:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole
number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed.
But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of
electors for President and Vice President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers
of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to
any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one
years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way
abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime,
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to
the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in
such State. 75

73. See id. at 1338 (holding that the self-care provisions of the FMLA are not a congruent-andproportional remedy because Congress did not amass enough evidence of sex discrimination in sickleave policies).
74. See supra text accompanying notes 39–42. Besides the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, congressional authority over voting also has been expanded through several other
constitutional amendments. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (prohibiting the abridgement of the right
to vote on the basis of sex); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 (prohibiting the use of poll taxes in
federal elections); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 (prohibiting the abridgement of the right to vote
for those eighteen and older on the basis of age).
75. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
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Section 2 is an example that courts can draw on in assessing whether
congressional legislation in this area is “appropriate,” and therefore
should dictate what “congruent and proportional” means in the context
of voting and elections. 76 Yet, in determining the scope of congressional
authority, the Shelby County Court ignored both the importance of
section 2 and its influence on the remaining provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, contrary to the case law. In Richardson v. Ramirez, 77 for
example, the Supreme Court held that states do not violate the Equal
Protection Clause by disenfranchising felons. 78 The Court concluded
that, because section 2 expressly exempts disenfranchisement grounded
on prior conviction of a felony, states do not violate section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment by excluding these individuals from the
franchise. 79 The Court looked to section 2 for guidance in determining
the scope of the substantive protections of section 1. 80 Under the same
rationale, Congress’s ability to reduce a state’s representation for
abridging the right to vote in both state and federal elections under
section 2 influences the scope of remedies that Congress can adopt under
section 5.
1.

Section 2 in the Legal Scholarship

Despite Ramirez, courts and commentators have not carefully
analyzed section 2, an assessment of which would have revealed that
Shelby County’s reliance on state sovereignty in this context is
misplaced. Jack Balkin discusses section 2 very briefly in his most
recent book, referring to it as a “clear rule about how to resolve key
unsettled issues of the [Civil] [W]ar,” a description that presumably
means that there is no need to refer to the constitutional structure or
legislative history in order to ascertain its meaning. 81 Balkin assumes
76. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 593–94 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that section 2, not section 1, regulates voting rights).
77. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
78. Id. at 54–55.
79. Id.
80. Id. (referring to section 2 as an “affirmative sanction” of state felon-disenfranchisement laws
and thereby exempting them from the scope of section 1); see also Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305,
316–17 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the legislative
debate surrounding the VRA show that Congress did not intend the VRA to apply to felon
disenfranchisement laws, which would have altered the constitutional balance between the states
and the federal government).
81. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 26 (2011); see also id. at 14 (“When the text provides
an unambiguous, concrete, and specific rule, the principles or purposes behind the text cannot
override the textual command.”).
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that, unlike section 1, section 2 is “unambiguous,” leaving no open
questions to be answered by courts or Congress in interpreting its
provisions. 82 However, Balkin’s interpretation is not true to the text
given that section 5 gives Congress the “power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” 83 This language
arguably refers to all of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and not just section 1. 84
Similarly, Akhil Amar spends a few pages of his recent work on
section 2, but unlike Balkin, he concludes that the provision, by virtue of
its penalty, creates an affirmative right to vote. 85 Any time that a state
disenfranchises its residents in violation of section 2, according to Amar,
the penalty of reduced representation must be imposed. 86 If Congress
fails to implement the penalty, as it has for well over a century, Amar
believes that section 2 still creates a general right to vote because “there
can be no disenfranchisement imposed upon the group of presumptive
voters textually specified by section 2.” 87
Although they take different views on the meaning of section 2,
Balkin and Amar make a mistake similar to much of the legal
scholarship by assuming that the specificity of section 2’s penalty ends
all inquiry into its interpretive impact on the scope of congressional
authority under section 5. 88 Amar, in particular, views the failure of
82. Id. at 26 (contrasting “the glittering generalities of section 1” with the “more rule-bound and
hardwired features of sections 2, 3, and 4”).
83. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
84. Note that my argument is not that the Framers explicitly viewed section 5 as an avenue for
imposing penalties other than reduced representation at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted; most of the focus in the legislative debates was on the harshness of the penalty rather than
discerning if Congress had the authority to pass other penalties to further section 2’s substantive
protections. Indeed, discussions leading up to the Fifteenth Amendment seem to indicate that there
were some in Congress who believed that section 2’s penalty was exclusive. See, e.g., CONG.
GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d. Sess. 2606 (1868) (statement of Sen. William Stewart). Post-enactment
legislation and political realities later forced Congress to embrace a broad reading of its authority
under both the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth Amendments, a view that is consistent with the
constitutional text. See infra Part II.
85. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 188 (2012).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 189.
88. Besides Balkin and Amar, other scholars have focused on different aspects of section 2, such
as its exemption of felon disenfranchisement. See, e.g., Janai S. Nelson, The First Amendment,
Equal Protection, and Felon Disenfranchisement: A New Viewpoint, 65 FLA. L. REV. 111 (2013).
Scholars have also debated whether Washington, D.C., is constitutionally entitled to a voting
member in the House because of section 2’s language that representatives are “apportioned among
the several states.” See Mark S. Scarberry, Historical Considerations and Congressional
Representation for the District of Columbia: Constitutionality of the D.C. House Voting Rights Bill
in Light of Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment and the History of the Creation of the
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Congress to impose section 2’s penalty as an opening for the courts to
intervene since “there shall be no disenfranchisement without the
apportionment penalty”; thus, Congress’s failure to impose the penalty
led the Warren Court to embrace section 2’s mandate through its votingrights cases. 89 What Amar overlooks, however, is that the interpretive
difficulties arise, not from disagreement over who should enforce section
2, but from the general language in section 5 giving Congress the power
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment by “appropriate” means.
The scope of this authority cannot be determined by reference to the
text of section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which, for example, says
nothing about section 5 being remedial in nature or lacking a substantive
component. Yet the Court derived these limitations on congressional
authority by interpreting the text in light of the legislative history and the
principles and norms underlying the document as a whole. 90 As John
Hart Ely recognized over three decades ago, the provisions of the
Constitution range from the specific to the general, and it is impossible
to supply the content of the more general provisions through clausebound interpretivism. 91 For example, we know that the Equal Protection
Clause forbids inequality, but the Court has interpreted its provisions in
light of current political disputes because of the indeterminacy of its
words. 92 The Clause also has been interpreted in light of other provisions
District, 60 ALA. L. REV. 783 (2009). Some debate also has been triggered by section 2’s limitation
to male citizens, see, for example, Reva Siegel, She the People: the Nineteenth Amendment, Sex
Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947 (2002), but there has been no indepth consideration of how section 2 influences the scope of congressional enforcement authority
under section 5. William Van Alstyne has touched on this issue tangentially, arguing that section 2
is not the exclusive remedy for voting rights violations such that Congress is precluded from relying
on section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to regulate voting rights. See William W. Van Alstyne,
The Fourteenth Amendment, the “Right” to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth
Congress, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 33, 45 (arguing that there was no consensus in the Thirty-Ninth
Congress that “§ 2 would preclude Congress (or the courts) from employing sources of
constitutional authority other than § 2 to affect state suffrage power”). Nonetheless, the trend is that
most scholars have overlooked the importance of section 2 to modern day debates about voting
rights.
89. AMAR, supra note 85, at 189 (arguing that the penalty of section 2 lives through “Warren
Court right-to-vote case law” and provides a sound textual basis for a general right to vote).
90. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512–36 (1997).
91. ELY, supra note 23, at 11–41 (discussing the implausibility of a “clause-bound”
interpretivism).
92. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding that the
right to vote is a fundamental interest under the Equal Protection Clause, despite the fact that the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment never intended to create an explicit right to vote); Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that the separate-but-equal doctrine of racial
segregation violates the Equal Protection Clause, despite the lack of historical evidence that the
Framers intended the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to segregation in schools).
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in the Constitution because, as Ely observes, “we are left with a
provision whose general concern—equality—is clear enough but whose
content beyond that cannot be derived from anything within its four
corners or the known intentions of its framers.” 93 Ely focuses on the
constitutional structure and procedural values derived therefrom in order
to provide guidance to courts in implementing the substantive policies
that the text is meant to protect but is simply not clear about.94 More
recently, Akhil Amar has employed a similar methodology that views
the clauses holistically, determining the meaning of a word based on
how the word is used in different constitutional provisions. 95
As with Balkin, Ely, and Amar, the constitutional text and structure
are the starting point here. Like many of the substantive provisions of
the Constitution, the meaning and scope of Congress’s enforcement
authority is also indeterminate, and what legislation is “appropriate” can
be determined only by reference to sources outside the four corners of
the text. 96 To answer this question, this Article looks at how the
Constitution in its entirety delegates authority over elections to the states
and the federal government in order to determine the scope of the
congressional authority in this area.
2.

The Spectrum of Congressional Authority over Elections

The Constitution is relatively unambiguous that the states have broad
authority over elections, but it is also apparent from the text that
Congress has the authority to intervene in certain instances. The
Elections Clause of article I, section 4 provides that the states shall
choose “[t]he Times, Places, and Manner of holding elections,” for
representatives and senators, but subject to Congress’s ability to “make

93. ELY, supra note 23, at 31; see also BALKIN, supra note 81, at 12–13 (“[W]hen we ask about
the ‘meaning’ of the equal protection clause, we could be asking (1) what concepts the words in the
clause point to; (2) how to apply the clause; (3) the purpose or function of the clause; (4) the
intentions behind the clause; or (5) what the clause is associated with in our minds . . . .”).
94. ELY, supra note 23, at 101 (arguing that the Constitution, with only a few exceptions, “has
been a process of government, not a governing ideology” (footnotes omitted)).
95. Amar, supra note 23, at 779 (“Ely does not specifically suggest that we attend to the patterns
of words and phrases that repeat themselves in the document. But if his general methodological
prescription is not quite intratextualism, as I have defined it, it is rather close. Like intratextualism,
Ely’s approach invites textualists to read clauses holistically, rather than in isolated, clause-bound
fashion.”); see also id. at 764 (using intratextualism to bolster Chief Justice Marshall’s judicialreview analysis in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
96. See, e.g., infra Part II.B (discussing the disagreement among the Framers about whether the
Fifteenth Amendment would address facially neutral laws that have the effect, but not the intent, of
abridging the right to vote on racial grounds).
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or alter such Regulations.” 97 As I have argued elsewhere, this provision
forms the basis of our system of federal elections by giving states
plenary authority to set the ground rules while Congress retains a veto
power over state regulations. 98 This framework of decentralized control
exists throughout the Constitution. In article I, section 2 and the
Seventeenth Amendment, respectively, the people elect members of the
House of Representatives and the Senate. While the states choose the
“Qualification requisite for Electors,” for both state and federal
elections, 99 Congress retains the ability, under article I, section 5, to be
“the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own
Members.” 100 Because of its veto authority under the Elections Clause
and the Qualifications Clause over both who is elected and the manner
of their selection, Congress retains final say over the composition of the
federal government, making Congress, not the states, sovereign with
respect to federal elections. 101
More difficult questions surround the relationship between the states
and the federal government over the regulation of state elections. The
states, consistent with their authority under the Tenth Amendment, are
arguably sovereign with respect to state elections, 102 but this sovereignty
is limited by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 103 Specifically,
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
98. Tolson, supra note 8; see also Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., __U.S.__, 133 S.
Ct. 2247, 2253 (2013) (noting that the Elections Clause is a “default provision” that “invests the
States with responsibility for the mechanics of congressional elections, but only so far as Congress
declines to pre-empt state choices” (quoting Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997))); Derek T.
Muller, Invisible Federalism and the Electoral College, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1237 (2012) (arguing
against a national-popular-vote initiative for presidential elections because eliminating the role of
the states in selecting the President through the electoral college would undermine our system of
federalism).
99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
100. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
101. See generally Tolson, supra note 8.
102. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013) (“[E]ach State has the
power to prescribe the qualifications of its officers and the manner in which they shall be chosen.”
(quoting Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 161 (1892))); see also Inter Tribal Council
of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2263 (noting that the states, not Congress, have the authority to set voter
qualifications for state and federal elections).
103. Besides the Amendments’ explicit nondiscrimination principle, another basis for federal
intervention in state elections is where, for example, “the election process itself reaches the point of
patent and fundamental unfairness” and therefore implicates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Roe v. Alabama ex rel. Evans, 43 F.3d 574, 580 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1060 (2000). Otherwise, states retain
control over their own elections. Compare Karlan, supra note 33, at 17 (reading the Elections
Clause as a plenary grant of authority over all elections), with Tolson, supra note 8 (recognizing that
Congress’s authority under the Elections Clause is not sufficient to justify the scope of section 5
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section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, by preventing abridgment of
the right to vote on nonspecified grounds, represents an abrogation of the
sovereignty that the states retained via the Elections Clause and the
Tenth Amendment. Thus, the pertinent question is this: how much of
this sovereignty has been delegated to the federal government? The
answer is not readily discoverable from the constitutional text alone, but
assessing sections 2 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment together helps
illuminate the scope of this authority. 104
In particular, Congress’s authority to enact lesser penalties than
reduced representation under section 5 respects the sovereignty that
states retain over elections, recognizes expanded federal power under the
Reconstruction Amendments, and is consistent with a principle of
statutory construction employed by the Court that construes a grant of
authority to include lesser powers. 105 Pursuant to this maxim, one can

because the states retain limited sovereignty over state and local elections that have no direct federal
interest).
104. See BALKIN, supra note 81, at 14 (“[W]here the text offers an abstract standard or principle,
we must try to determine what principles underlie the text in order to build constructions that are
consistent with it.”); id. at 260–62 (arguing that history should be used to derive the underlying
principles of the text and to resolve underlying ambiguities); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991) (identifying the various modalities of constitutional interpretation
including the text, structure, precedent, prudential concerns, moral commitments, and history). I am
not attempting to debate the weight that should be given to each of these considerations or the
merits of various theories of constitutional interpretation, but it is clear that I am making my case
largely based on the constitutional text, structure, and legislative history, which most of the various
theories agree is the starting point for constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); Richard H.
Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1189 (1987); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 862 (1989); David
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996).
105. Because of the Necessary and Proper Clause, the presence of an explicit power in the
Constitution has not, to my knowledge, been interpreted to prevent Congress from adopting lesser
regulations that are incidental to furthering the aims of the primary grant of power. See GARY
LAWSON, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, THE ORIGINS OF THE
NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 119 (2010) (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause grants
incidental powers defined as “lesser in importance than the principal power” but is not a general
grant of authority). Similarly, section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which the Court had
previously interpreted as similar in scope to the Necessary and Proper Clause, allows Congress to
impose lesser penalties than section 2’s reduction in representation. The ability to impose lesser
penalties is still possible post-City of Boerne so long as the congruence-and-proportionality test is
met, but arguably, the presence of the words “shall enforce” in section 5 gives Congress significant
authority to determine what means are “appropriate.” See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The
“Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43
DUKE L.J. 267, 277–79 (1993) (discussing various power-granting provisions of the Constitution
that include phrases such as “shall think,” “shall judge,” and “shall deem,” and concluding that
these provisions expressly make a political actor’s judgment—rather than objective necessity,
propriety, or expediency—the test of constitutionality).
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view section 2 as a broad grant of authority to Congress but, because of
the specificity of its penalty, it also can function as a ceiling on
congressional authority to address abridgments of the right to vote rather
than a floor. 106 In other words, Congress can do no more than reduce a
state’s delegation, but it has substantial authority under section 5 to
impose lesser penalties. 107 That section 2 represents an extreme penalty
and therefore a ceiling on congressional authority is based on the view
that, prior to the Reconstruction Amendments, the states enjoyed broad
authority over their electoral mechanisms, even with respect to federal
elections. 108 Given this, a lesser penalty arguably is one that intrudes on
state sovereignty less than the penalty of reduced representation. 109
Section 5’s grant of authority to further the Amendment’s aims through
“appropriate” legislation incorporated both the strong medicine of
reduced representation and the ability to impose lesser penalties through
ordinary legislation. 110
106. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2629–42 (2012)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (relying on the reasoning that a grant of
authority includes the lesser powers to reject the invalidation of the Medicaid expansion because
Congress’s authority to repeal the program altogether necessarily includes the power to alter or
amend it); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 762–63 (1988) (reasoning
that the power to prohibit speech includes the lesser power to license it); Posadas de Puerto Rico
Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 345–46 (1986) (holding that “the greater
power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising
of casino gambling”); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 368 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (invoking “the common-sense maxim that the greater includes the lesser”).
107. Limiting Congress to imposing “lesser penalties” respects the original framework of section
2 while recognizing that the open-ended language of section 5 delegates some questions of
application to future generations. See BALKIN, supra note 81, at 15 (“Constitutional doctrines
created by courts, and institutions and practices created by the political branches, flesh out and
implement the constitutional text and underlying principles.”).
108. See infra Part II.A; see also Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., __U.S.__, 133 S.
Ct. 2247, 2271 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Under the Elections Clause, the States have the
authority to specify the times, places, and manner of federal elections except to the extent that
Congress chooses to provide otherwise. And in recognition of this allocation of authority, it is
appropriate to presume that the States retain this authority unless Congress has clearly manifested a
contrary intent.”); Franita Tolson, Partisan Gerrymandering as a Safeguard of Federalism, 2010
UTAH L. REV. 859, 884–87 (discussing the federalism concerns raised by the 1842 Reapportionment
Act, despite the fact that it required single-member districts for House elections and did not affect
state and local elections).
109. Cf. Halberstam, supra note 29, at 948 (noting that section 5 is “nothing like the categorical,
one-size-fits-all rule of strict equality imposed by the one-person/one-vote cases”).
110. Cf. McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 418 n.174 (D.D.C. 2003) (Henderson, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting the Tenth Amendment
challenge to a provision of Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 that allegedly “restrict[s] the
activities of federal officeholders and candidates with respect to state and local election campaigns
and processes” because “the broader, more invasive power of the federal government to regulate
municipal securities professionals who solicit funds for state officials includes the narrower power
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Determining whether penalties are less intrusive of state sovereignty
is admittedly difficult given that congressional authority to regulate
elections falls along a spectrum. 111 On the one hand are the regulations
that govern the time, place, and manner of federal elections, which is
when congressional authority is at its apogee. 112 Pursuant to this
authority, Congress also can regulate so-called mixed elections, where
its regulations can encompass any part of an election involved in the
selection of congressmen. 113
On the other end of the spectrum are regulations that govern voter
qualifications and state elections, instances in which congressional
power is arguably at its lowest. 114 In Oregon v. Mitchell, 115 for example,
the Court held that the 1970 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act,
which lowered the voting age to eighteen, were unconstitutional as
applied to state and local elections because the Amendments
impermissibly intruded on state sovereignty. 116 The Court reasoned that,
unlike the discriminatory use of literacy tests, which can be prohibited in
all elections consistent with the Fifteenth Amendment, states retain the
ability to determine the qualifications of electors in state and local

to regulate federal candidates who solicit funds for state officials” (emphasis in original)), aff’d in
part and rev’d in part, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
111. In certain instances, there may be a fundamental difference between punishing state officials
through the criminalization of certain activities and punishing the states as states through reduced
representation, but I do not think this is dispositive here, given the penalty of reduced representation
could be triggered through the discriminatory actions of state officials who, in the context of voter
registration, election design, and ballot access, are usually acting under color of state law, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2006).
112. See Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2253–54 (“The power of Congress over
the ‘Times, Places and Manner’ of congressional elections ‘is paramount, and may be exercised at
any time, and to any extent which it deems expedient; and so far as it is exercised, and no farther,
the regulations effected supersede those of the State which are inconsistent therewith.’” (quoting Ex
Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 392 (1880))).
113. See In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731, 752 (1888) (holding that Congress’s power to regulate mixed
elections under the Constitution “cannot be questioned”); United States v. McCranie, 169 F.3d 723,
727 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that both the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Elections Clause
empower Congress to regulate mixed elections even where federal candidates run unopposed).
114. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2258 (“Prescribing voting qualifications,
therefore, ‘forms no part of the power to be conferred upon the national government’ by the
Elections Clause, which is ‘expressly restricted to the regulation of the times, the places, and the
manner of elections.’” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 60, at 369 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 2003) (emphasis in original))).
115. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
116. Id. 124–25 (“No function is more essential to the separate and independent existence of the
States and their governments than the power to determine within the limits of the Constitution the
qualifications of their own voters for state, county, and municipal offices and the nature of their own
machinery for filling local public offices.”).
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elections absent race discrimination. 117 The Court acknowledged that
“the original design of the Founding Fathers was altered by the Civil
War Amendments and various other amendments to the Constitution,” 118
but declined to find that these changes deprived the states of all
sovereignty over state and local elections. 119 Similarly, the recent case of
Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc. 120 sharply limited
Congress’s ability to regulate voter qualifications in both state and
federal elections, finding that “the Elections Clause empowers Congress
to regulate how federal elections are held, but not who may vote in
them.” 121
Remedies that fall somewhere between these two extremes, such as
the VRA’s preclearance regime, necessarily involve a subjective
determination about their intrusiveness on state sovereignty as a part of
the means-ends calculus. 122 One relevant factor in the case law in
assessing fit has been an under-enforced constitutional principle that I
term the “anti-circumvention norm.” This norm clarifies what it means
for the right to vote to be “denied . . . or in any way abridged” 123 in the
context of section 2 by allowing Congress to regulate certain voting
requirements that are presumptively constitutional but would otherwise
circumvent the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. 124 For
example, Congress could arguably preempt a state law that lacks
discriminatory intent if there is significant evidence that the regulation
would effectuate broad disenfranchisement and undermine the

117. Id.
118. Id. at 126.
119. Id. at 129.
120. __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013).
121. Id. at 2257.
122. Amar, supra note 29, at 117 (“Congress itself has hesitated to impose the draconian sanction
of reduced apportionment on offending states. So Congress, via the VRA, has done something far
gentler—something altogether proportionate to the core purposes of the right to vote explicitly set
forth in section 2.”); see also infra Part III.
123. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
124. This notion of an “underenforced norm” is borrowed from Lawrence Sager, who views the
Equal Protection Clause as embodying such a norm and argues that it is constitutional for legislation
to push equal-protection norms to their full conceptual boundaries, even if it is beyond the Court’s
interpretation of the Clause. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1215–16 (1978). This norm is not
intended to undermine the Court’s test in City of Boerne v. Flores, but should be a consideration in
whether that standard is met. Cf. ELY, supra note 23 (using the value of representationreinforcement to fill interpretive gaps in the Constitution); CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION (1993) (using the norm of deliberative democracy to do the same).
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protections of the Amendment. 125 Fidelity to this norm, which is derived
from the case law and implicit in section 2, helps determine which
remedies, other than reduced representation, are appropriate to address
abridgments of the right to vote. 126 A review of the legislative history of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments illustrates that this approach
to assessing the scope of Congress’s authority to enforce voting rights,
which relies on text, structure, and principle, is not only justified, but
required.
II.

THE PRESCIENCE OF THE THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS:
VOTING, STATE SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE FOURTEENTH
AND FIFTEENTH AMENDMENTS

The legislative debates over the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments reveal that Congress, in adopting section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, balanced the core values of expanding voting
rights and retaining state sovereignty over elections. Because of this
balancing, section 2 stands as the textual archetype of congressional
remedial power over voting. Thus, rather than relying on abstract
principles designed to limit the interpretive authority of Congress, as the
Court did in City of Boerne, 127 courts can use section 2 as the reference
point for determining whether Congress has exceeded the scope of its
enforcement authority in enacting voting rights legislation. Moreover,
section 2 remains a viable source of congressional power since section 1
125. Compare Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 202 (2008) (upholding
Indiana’s voter-identification law because there was no evidence in the record that the law would
result in broad disenfranchisement of indigent voters in the state), with Applewhite v.
Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2012 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 749 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct.
2, 2012) (granting a preliminary injunction enjoining Pennsylvania’s voter-identification law
because the lack of state-issued identification cards would have resulted in broad voter
disenfranchisement during the November 2012 election even though the law could validly be
enforced in the future). Arguably, if the state imposes a voter identification law to address an actual
problem with voter fraud, but makes it fairly easy for individuals to obtain free identification or to
vote provisionally, then the law would not run afoul of section 2, even if in practice the law results
in broad disenfranchisement. See Franita Tolson, What is Abridgment? A Critique of Two Section
Twos (Jan. 15, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Generous and easy access to
photo identification rebuts arguments that the law undermines the protections of the Amendments
even if, technically, a photo identification-card requirement constitutes an “abridg[ment].” See
Crawford, 553 U.S. at 197–99.
126. See infra Part III.
127. See, e.g., Michael McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne
v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 176 (1997) (“The historical evidence presented in the Boerne
opinion proves only that Congress was not intended to have authority to pass general legislation
determining what the privileges and immunities of citizens should be. It does not support the more
extreme claim that Congress lacks independent interpretive authority.”).
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of the Fifteenth Amendment was meant to complement rather than
replace it as a source of congressional authority, giving Congress broad
power to protect the right to vote. 128
A.

Discovering the Framers’ Intent: Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment as the Baseline for Voting Rights Remedies

The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment drafted section 2 to
address a unique problem presented by the abolition of slavery: the
conquered South’s representation in the House would increase by at least
fifteen seats even if, as expected, southern states would deny the
franchise to African-Americans. 129 African-Americans no longer
counted as three-fifths of a person, giving the southern states more
representation in Congress than they had before the war. 130 In addressing
this issue, Congress wanted to protect the franchise from abridgement
under discriminatory state laws, but without completely displacing the
constitutional text and principles of federalism that delegated authority
over elections to the states. 131
128. The courts and the legal scholarship have overlooked section 2 because Congress has never
used it to reduce a state’s congressional delegation. By the twentieth century, many states in the
former confederacy, including Mississippi, Louisiana, South Carolina, and North Carolina, legally
disfranchised African-Americans. See Virginia E. Hench, The Death of Voting Rights: The Legal
Disenfranchisement of Minority Voters, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 727, 768 n.215 (1998). Scholars
have attributed this failure to the view that the Fifteenth Amendment has rendered obsolete the
penalty of section 2, a position that does not fully appreciate the historical circumstances
surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. See infra Part II.B.
Compare JOHN MABRY MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH
AMENDMENT 12, 16 (1909) (rejecting this argument), with Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon
Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259 (2004) (making this argument).
129. JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 23 (1956) (“[T]he
representation of fourteen former slave states would be increased from eighty-four, on the threefifths basis, to one hundred, based on total population. But, if an amendment were passed to base
representation on qualified voters, those states would lose eighteen representatives instead of
gaining sixteen.”); see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 141 (1866) (statement of Rep.
James Blaine) (proposing that “suffrage instead of population [be] the basis of apportioning
Representatives” so as to “deprive the lately rebellious States of the unfair advantage of a large
representation in this House, based on their colored population, so long as that population shall be
denied political rights by the legislation of those States”).
130. JAMES, supra note 129, at 23; see also FONER, supra note 36, at 252 (noting that the prewar
system in which blacks would go from three fifths of a person to being counted in full would, if left
unchanged, “allow ‘unrepentant . . . traitors,’ in alliance with Northern Democrats, to gain control of
Congress, compensate slaveowners for emancipation, and elect Robert E. Lee President in 1868”
(alternation in original) (quoting an unidentified representative)).
131. MATHEWS, supra note 128, at 12 (“There was little real difference in opinion among the
leaders in Congress as to the desirability of enlarging the sphere of political liberty for the negro
race. The chief difficulty in accomplishing this result lay in the fact that is could apparently be done
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Because of this concern, Congress had considerable debate over what
means would be appropriate to ensure that southern states granted civil
and political rights to African-Americans. Arguably, most of those
congressmen involved in the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment
wanted to impose a nondiscrimination principle on the states and require
that they extend suffrage to all qualified males, regardless of race. But
there is little doubt that few in the thirty-ninth Congress intended to
explicitly grant the right to vote through the Fourteenth Amendment’s
provisions, a move widely viewed as raising federalism concerns. 132
Instead, Representative Thaddeus Stevens offered an amendment to John
Bingham’s proposed text of section 1 133 that would “[s]ecure to all
citizens of the United States, in every state, the same political rights and
privileges; and to all persons in every State, equal protection in the
enjoyment of life, liberty and property.” 134 Indeed, this amendment and
only by limiting the sphere of governmental action in all the States to a corresponding extent. There
was a feeling too widespread to be safely antagonized that the regulation of the suffrage was a
matter properly belonging to the state governments.”); see also CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess.
2665 (1868) (statement of Sen. Roscoe Conkling) (“Without going back of the fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution, be it ratified now or about to be ratified, it seems to me clear that by
the unmistakable force of its language the regulation of suffrage in the States belongs to the States
themselves.”).
132. Some radicals like Senator Charles Sumner and Representative Thaddeus Stevens hoped that
the penalty in section 2 would have the practical effect of mandating universal suffrage, but all
recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment, on its face, did not confer this right. The criticism that
the Framers were trying to achieve indirectly what they could not obtain directly—AfricanAmerican suffrage—was repeated throughout the debates in Congress and in public. See, e.g.,
JAMES, supra note 129, at 129 (“[Representative] Rogers averred that by the second section the
committee majority had been trying to obtain Negro suffrage.”).
133. Representative John Bingham proposed the following language as a possible section 5,
although it later became the basis for section 1:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure
to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and
to all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866) (statement of Rep. John Bingham). Whether
Representative Bingham intended the right to vote be included as a part of the privileges or
immunities of citizens is contestable, see Kurt Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, Part II: John Bingham and the Second Draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J.
329, 334 (2011) (arguing that the “federal privileges and immunities were those ‘defined in the
Constitution,’ such as the liberties enumerated in the first eight amendments to the Constitution”
and that “Bingham expressly limited his efforts to enforcing textually enumerated rights”), but
arguably, Representative Thaddeus Stevens’s amendment to Representative Bingham’s proposed
text was designed to add an explicit nondiscrimination principle, see generally Randy E. Barnett,
Whence Comes Section One? The Abolitionist Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 3 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 165 (2011) (arguing that, unlike Representative Stevens’s proposal, Representative
Bingham’s proposal was not limited to nondiscrimination).
134. JAMES, supra note 129, at 81 (quoting BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT
COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION: 39TH CONGRESS, 1895–1867, at 51 (1914)); see
also id. (“It is obvious that the ‘political rights’ part of the proposed change was intended to open
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its focus on “equal protection” and granting everyone “the same political
rights and privileges” was embraced in principle by the Military
Reconstruction Act of 1867, and represented one of Congress’s first
attempts to impose equal suffrage in the south through ordinary
legislation. The Military Reconstruction Act made the governments of
the southern states established under presidential reconstruction
provisional until they ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and held
constitutional conventions staffed by delegates “elected by the male
citizens of said state, twenty-one years old and upward, of whatever
race, color, or previous condition.” 135
Initially, draft section 2 focused on the denial of “civil and political
rights,” 136 but the Joint Committee on Reconstruction opted to remove
this language and focus solely on discriminatory denials of the franchise:
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States which may be included within this Union
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole
number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed;
Provided, That whenever the elective franchise shall be denied
or abridged in any State on account of race or color, all persons
of such race or color shall be excluded from the basis of
representation. 137
Congress’s motivation, first in preserving civil and political rights in
drafts of both sections 1 and 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, then later
in explicitly imposing a penalty for vote denial in section 2, was to
address the “black codes” adopted across the South following the end of
the Civil War. 138 The black codes created a separate criminal justice
the way for Negro voting on a national scale.”); Stephen B. Weeks, The History of Negro Suffrage
in the South, 9 POL. SCI. Q. 671, 684 (1894) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment “had only
sought to stimulate the states to grant the suffrage to the negro”).
135. Military Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428, 429.
136. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 141 (1866) (statement of Rep. James Blaine).
Representative Blaine proposed the following language for section 2:
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be
included within this Union according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined
by taking the whole number of persons except those to whom civil or political rights or
privileges are denied or abridged by the constitution or laws of any state on account of race or
color.
Id. at 141–42.
137. Id. at 351.
138. See FONER, supra note 36, at 341–42 (noting that Democrats in the South employed violence
and threats including “cutting off credit to blacks attending Republican meetings,” “landlords
threaten[ed] to evict from plantations” African-Americans who voted for Republicans, and the Ku
Klux Klan instituted a “‘reign of terror’ against Republican leaders black and white”); Joe M.
Richardson, Florida Black Codes, 47 FL. HIST. Q. 365, 373 (1969) (noting that African-Americans
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system for the former slaves, extensively regulated their labor,
disenfranchised them, and provided little redress for injustices
committed against them by whites. 139 Violence erupted once state
leaders sympathetic to radical reconstruction began to endorse plans to
convene constitutional conventions to enfranchise African-Americans. 140
The black codes and the violence that persisted in the post-war South
justified the passage of a constitutional amendment allowing Congress to
intervene in state electoral processes at every level because wrongful
denial of the vote had become a systemic problem that was not limited to
federal elections. 141
The remedy imposed by section 2, which sought to disincentivize
broad disenfranchisement, was appropriately tailored to address this
harm, particularly given the underlying federalism issues. In the view of
the Republicans, the draft amendment, by penalizing those states with
the highest levels of African-American male voters, was the most
politically palatable and constitutionally tolerable way of protecting
access to the franchise—and guaranteeing the future of the Republican
Party—in the South. 142 An affirmative guarantee of the right to vote
had no political rights, could not carry firearms, and could not testify against whites).
139. See FONER, supra note 36, at 121 (“Freedmen were assaulted and murdered for attempting
to leave plantations, disputing contract settlements, not laboring in the manner desired by their
employers, attempting to buy or rent land, and resisting whippings.”); Richardson, supra note 138,
at 377 (“The passage of black codes by Florida and other southern states was unfortunate and
unwise. They insured what Florida wanted to avoid—intercession by the federal government.”).
140. FONER, supra note 36, at 263; see also id. at 412–15 (discussing how some Republicans
enfranchised ex-Confederates in order to gain power at the state level).
141. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 472 (1870) (statement of Sen. Eugene Casserly)
(“‘The right to vote’ of that class of persons [i.e., African-Americans] had been ‘denied or abridged’
in many, perhaps most of the States, and might be again in all. Hence there was an evil, real or
supposed, to be remedied and prevented.”); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1865)
(discussing restrictive laws to regulate the labor of blacks in Georgia, Mississippi, and Louisiana
and proposing a bill that would invalidate all laws in the former confederacy that maintain
“inequality of civil rights and immunities . . . by reason or in consequence of any distinctions or
differences in color”); see also FONER, supra note 36, at 277 (“The astonishingly rapid evolution of
Congressional attitudes that culminated in black suffrage arose both from the crisis created by the
obstinacy of Johnson and the white South, and the determination of Radicals, blacks, and eventually
Southern Unionists not to accept a Reconstruction program that stopped short of this demand.”).
142. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 358 (1866). In debating whether representation should
be based on qualified voters rather than population, Representative Roscoe Conkling argued that
making qualified voters the basis of representation was less constitutionally problematic than
depriving states of the power to disqualify voters on the basis of race:
The second plan mentioned, the proposition to prohibit States from denying civil or political
rights to any class of persons, encounters a great objection on the threshold. It trenches upon
the principle of existing local sovereignty. It denies to the people of the several States the right
to regulate their own affairs in their own way. It takes away a right which has been always
supposed to inhere in the States and transfers it to the General Government. It meddles with a
right reserved to the States when the Constitution was adopted, and to which they will long
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would have created political backlash in the North, where many people
were against African-American suffrage, and in the South, where exConfederates could easily abridge this right, mandating federal oversight
for the foreseeable future. 143 Instead, the Framers addressed the South’s
attempt to garner the benefit of increased representation in Congress
while instituting a legal regime that placed African-Americans in a
quasi-bondage state by linking representation to eligible voters rather
than population to deter future wrongdoing. 144 The Committee’s draft
and proposed amendments to section 2 all proceeded from the premise
that states still had, under the Elections Clause, the authority to choose
the time, place, and manner of elections, to set the qualifications of
electors under article I, section 2, and to govern state elections pursuant
to the Tenth Amendment. However, the South’s denial of basic rights to
African-Americans meant that this power could no longer be
unencumbered. 145
cling before they surrender it.
Id.; see also JAMES, supra note 129, at 22 (“[S]uch great emphasis on representation in 1865 seems
to have been prompted by a desire for Negro votes in the near future as an aid to national
Republican power . . . .”).
143. See FONER, supra note 36, at 241 (noting that moderate Republicans were not “enthusiastic
about the prospect of black suffrage, either in the North, where it represented a political liability, or
the South, where it seemed less likely to provide a stable basis for a new Republican party than a
political alliance with forward-looking white Southerners”).
144. Unsurprisingly, attempts to enfranchise African-Americans made the Republican Party
unpopular with southern whites, and the hope was that section 2 would help account for this lack of
support in elections going forward by ensuring that African-Americans remained enfranchised. See
William A. Russ, Jr., The Negro and White Disenfranchisement During Radical Reconstruction, 19
J. NEGRO HIST. 171, 177 (1934) (“The existence of the Republican party is bound up with the
establishment of Negro suffrage. If it fails here its career as a national party is closed. If it falters in
this course it must die.” (quoting ANTI-SLAVERY STANDARD, Oct. 19, 1867)). Moderate
Republicans like Representative Bingham did not necessarily endorse this position. JAMES, supra
note 129, at 130 (noting that Representative Bingham claimed that section 2 “only equalized
representation among the states”). But by 1866, Representative Bingham believed that the southern
states should be readmitted once they ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and established black
suffrage. Id. at 274; see also MATHEWS, supra note 128, at 17–18 (“[T]he national legislature
endeavored by every means in its power to make negro suffrage in the South as permanent as a
constitutional amendment would make it, without in any way affecting the control of the Northern
States over the qualifications of their voters.”).
145. This concern about state sovereignty has to be placed in the broader context of
Reconstruction, where the federal government was already intervening in southern life to an
unprecedented extent. To minimize the intrusion, many Democrats, ex-Confederates, and Moderate
Republicans expressed their willingness to extend suffrage to African-Americans in order to punish
ex-confederates, avoid reduced representation in Congress, and to change the terms of the national
debate from African-American suffrage to other issues, but once the political tides changed, many
of these individuals planned to use their new political capital to undo the gains made by AfricanAmericans. FONER, supra note 36, at 271. Section 2 gave Congress the authority to prevent
backsliding.
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That Congress made the proper means-ends determination with
respect to section 2 is best illustrated by the debate over its scope.
Despite the substantial record of civil-rights violations in the South,
there still was considerable disagreement over how the penalty in section
2 would punish those states that abridged the right to vote. During
discussions in the House, for example, some representatives noted that
limiting the penalty in section 2 to abridgments on the basis of race
could easily be circumvented by the states. As one scholar observed, the
debates over early drafts of section 2 reflected this concern:
Thomas Jenckes of Rhode Island . . . objected that Southern
States by property qualifications could easily get around the
Reconstruction Committee’s bill, though not depriving Negroes
of the right to vote because of race or color. He asserted that if
South Carolina adopted a requirement that voters own fifty acres
of land, the Negroes would be just as easily disfranchised as by
a law based on race or color. The objection that property
qualifications were not covered by the bill was also raised by
Thomas Eliot of Massachusetts, and by Jehu Baker of Illinois,
who declared that “no State should reserve in her basis of
representation persons disfranchised and not represented, no
matter on what ground she so excludes them.” 146
Other representatives also questioned how property and educational
qualifications would operate given draft section 2’s limitation to
abridgments based on race. Representative Roscoe Conkling, a member
of the Committee on Reconstruction, responded that both of these
qualifications would be permissible “if framed to operate impartially on
both races,” 147 implying that neutral criteria discriminately applied could
trigger the penalty of section 2.
Nevertheless, the Senate rejected the language in the House version,
which excluded “all persons of such race or color . . . from the basis of
representation” whenever the right to vote is abridged. 148 Pursuant to this
language, discrimination against one African-American conceivably
could remove the entire population of African-Americans from the
state’s basis of representation. 149 Many Republicans viewed this
146. George David Zuckerman, A Consideration of the History and Present Status of Section 2 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 97–98 (1961) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 376, 385, 406 (1866)).
147. JAMES, supra note 129, at 61–62; see also id. at 133 (noting that Senator Sherman found
section 2 of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment “as the most objectionable feature because under
it intelligence tests as a voting qualification would be discouraged”).
148. Id. at 60.
149. Id. at 57, 60.
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outcome as disproportionate to the harm to be addressed and the
equivalent of forcing African-American suffrage on the South.
In contrast, leading radical Charles Sumner condemned the language
in section 2 for “acknowledging that states were entitled to limit suffrage
on racial grounds” since the provision implicitly countenanced the
South’s ability to discriminate on the basis of race or color by not
directly forbidding it. 150 After the Senate rejected the House proposal,
members of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction proposed an
alternative draft. Notably, the key differences from the earlier proposal,
addressing the concerns raised by Sumner and others, is the proportional
reduction of representation for abridging the right to vote and the
elimination of racial discrimination as the sole basis for reduction:
[W]henever in any State the elective franchise shall be denied to
any portion of its male citizens, not less than twenty-one years
of age, or in any way abridged, except for participation in
rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation of such
States shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male
citizens not less than twenty-one years of age. 151
In removing the reference to “race or color,” the proposed amendment
embraced two important insights ultimately endorsed in the final
version. 152 First, it embraced that discrimination in voting could occur
by proxy and the express reference to “race or color” limited Congress’s
ability to act when such discrimination occurs. 153 While some in the
Senate wanted to remove this language in order to avoid placing any
150. FONER, supra note 36, at 253, 255; see also JAMES, supra note 129, at 73 (noting that
Senator Sumner objected “to bringing inequalities into the language of the Constitution;” that the
amendment “sanctioned taxation without representation;” and finally, that the amendment “made
concessions to state rights” while compromising “human liberty” on the basis of color).
151. JAMES, supra note 129, at 112; see also Zuckerman, supra note 146, at 101 (“[T]he debates
in Congress had shown that qualifications based on race or color were not the only way Negroes
could be disfranchised; property or educational qualifications might also operate to achieve the
same result. Thus the committee searched for language extending beyond qualifications based on
race or color in determining the basis of representation. The committee searched also for language
which, in form at least, would be applicable to all states and avoid charges of sectionalism and
which would be strong enough to satisfy the radicals who claimed that the previous amendment
sanctioned disfranchisement based on race or color.”).
152. James contends that the exclusion of the term “race or color” was an oversight, JAMES,
supra note 129, at 113, but this does not square with the fact that a resolution introduced by a senate
member of the Joint Committee also excluded the term “race or color,” id. at 92, and that the final
version added the language “in any way abridged,” which intentionally provides a broader basis for
which the penalty of reduced representation would be exacted.
153. Zuckerman, supra note 146, at 97–98 (discussing how some Republicans did not want to
limit section 2’s penalty solely to abridgment on the basis of race or color).
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obligation on the northern states to enfranchise African-American
voters, its removal also gave Congress authority under section 2 to
penalize states for discrimination on grounds other than race. 154
Second, the exemption of abridgments based on “treason or crime”
from the penalty of section 2 is Congress’s assessment that it could not
remove all authority from the states to regulate the franchise, especially
since commission of a crime had long served as a basis for
disenfranchisement in the states. Although “treason or crime” could
serve as a proxy for racial discrimination similar to property and
educational qualifications, 155 this exemption promoted AfricanAmerican suffrage in the short term by allowing states to disenfranchise
ex-confederates and prevent them from regaining power. 156
Arguably, Congress’ analytical exercise in crafting section 2, a
penalty that balanced the states authority over elections against
extending the right to vote on a nondiscriminatory basis, represents the
proper baseline from which to assess congressional legislation enacted
pursuant to section 5. Section 2, although clearly designed to change the
status quo, embraces a nondiscrimination principle rather than an
explicit right to vote to respect federalism. 157 Functionally, this means
that states can still choose the qualifications of electors, so long as they
do so in a nondiscriminatory manner.
Section 2’s influence also extends beyond the context of the
154. Id. at 98–102.
155. See Richard M. Re & Christopher M. Re, Voting and Vice: Criminal Disenfranchisement
and the Reconstruction Amendments, 121 YALE L.J. 1584, 1591 (2012) (noting that legislation
adopted contemporaneously to section 2 used language narrower than the provision’s “other crime”
language in order to “combat racist disenfranchisement” based on crime); id. at 1628 (noting that
the Military Reconstruction Act permitted disenfranchisement only for the commission of “a felony
at common law”).
156. Russ, supra note 144, at 171 (observing that “one of the chief reasons in the minds of
idealists of the radical party for disabling white leaders [was] that blacks should be permitted to
function unhampered”). Another possible reason for inclusion of the “treason, or other crime”
language but not other grounds is because this is the only language which would receive a majority
of the votes in the Senate. See JAMES, supra note 129, at 68 (stating that although “[r]epresentation
based on voters would be unfair to the East and to border states like Missouri in which
disenfranchised ex-Confederates constituted a large part of the population,” the principal merit of
the amendment, according to at least one representative and supported by others, “lay in its
possibility of adoption; for it ‘accomplishes indirectly what we may not have the power to
accomplish directly’” (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 705 (1866) (statement of Sen.
William Fessenden))).
157. FONER, supra note 36, at 259 (“The Fourteenth Amendment can only be understood as a
whole, for while respecting federalism, it intervened directly in Southern politics, seeking to conjure
into being a new political leadership that would respect the principle of equality before the law.”);
cf. AMAR, supra note 85, at 188 (arguing that because of the nature of its penalty it effectively
operates as an affirmative grant).
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Fourteenth Amendment. Because of their shared drafting history, section
2 of the Fourteenth Amendment and section 1 of the Fifteenth
Amendment stand as aggregate sources of authority for voting rights
legislation, a fact best illustrated by the Enforcement Act of 1870.
B.

Discovering the Framers’ Intent: The Scope of Congressional
Enforcement Authority over Voting Rights

Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, in its final form, reflects a
series of political compromises balancing Congress’s concerns over
intruding on the state’s authority over elections against its desire to
expand access to the franchise. 158 The Framers adopted section 2 to
protect the newly freed slaves from being disenfranchised through direct
and indirect means once the southern states were allowed back into the
union. 159 Once it became evident that disenfranchisement would proceed
on a massive scale if southern whites regained power, the Framers
passed the Fifteenth Amendment. 160 The breadth of section 2, and its
extension to both state and federal elections, gave Congress significant
authority to regulate the franchise through indirect pressure; however,
section 2 has to be read in conjunction with the Fifteenth Amendment in
order to illuminate the actual scope of Congress’s enforcement authority.
This interpretive approach is supported by Supreme Court precedent
contemporaneous to the Framing that relied on intratextualism to derive
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 161 For example, in the
Slaughter-House Cases, 162 a group of individuals challenged a law
creating a state-authorized monopoly requiring all butchers to slaughter
their livestock at one central location.163 The Court held that this
monopoly did not violate the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because the Clause protects only those rights
158. FONER, supra note 36, at 251–61.
159. JAMES, supra note 129, at 22.
160. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 672 (1869) (statement of Sen. Henry Wilson) (“The
crowning act of emancipation, the great constitutional amendment, was sternly resisted. The
fourteenth article of amendment to the Constitution, the civil rights bill, the Freedman’s Bureau bill,
every measure that we have passed to enlarge the rights of privileges of that emancipated race, to
protect them, to life them, has encountered not only the sternest opposition of those who were
against us politically, but it has encountered the prejudices of a portion of those who ordinarily vote
with us.”); FONER, supra note 36, at 412–59 (discussing how some Southern Democrats tried to
convince the nation that they were beyond racial issues, but that most still refused to accept the
reality of Reconstruction and African-American suffrage).
161. Amar, supra note 23.
162. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
163. Id. at 59–60.
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belonging to “citizens of the United States” rather than “citizens of a
state.” 164 Notably, the Slaughter-House Cases Court looked to the
Articles of Confederation, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
article I, and the case law in making a distinction between those rights
protected by United States citizenship and those belonging to citizens of
a state. 165
Like the Privileges and/or Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment and article I, the textual and historical link between section
1 of the Fifteenth Amendment and section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, both dealing with abridgments of the right to vote and
linked by the drafting history, mandate that they be interpreted in light of
each other in determining the scope of congressional authority. 166 In
particular, since section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment predates section
1 of the Fifteenth Amendment, section 2 is instructive in determining
what Congress understood the scope of the Fifteenth Amendment to be,
and what that provision added to Congress’s ability to enforce the
nondiscrimination principle of the Fourteenth Amendment. 167 Less clear
are the prudential considerations that are relevant to interpreting
congressional authority jointly under these Amendments, as Congress
has never utilized the penalty of section 2. 168 Nevertheless, the
legislative history indicates that section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
and section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment were supposed to complement
each other as sources of congressional authority over voting, and thus
should be read together.
1.

The Historical Link Between Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment

There is a historical and textual link between the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments because language originally proposed for section
2 of the Fourteenth Amendment ultimately became the basis for section
1 of the Fifteenth Amendment. 169 In addition to the committee’s draft
164. Id. at 74.
165. Id. at 75.
166. See Amar, supra note 23.
167. MATHEWS, supra note 128, at 14 (arguing that section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, “[a]s
far as subject matter is concerned[,] is really more germane to the Fifteenth Amendment than to the
other sections of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
168. See BOBBITT, supra note 104, at 13 (identifying prudential concerns as one of the modalities
of constitutional interpretation).
169. See MATHEWS, supra note 128, at 11–12 (arguing that section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment is consistent with the Fifteenth Amendment).
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section 2 that passed the House, there were two alternative proposals on
the table in early 1866 that would have prevented, or alternatively,
penalized states for denying the right to vote on the basis of race of
color. The first proposal, put forth by Senator Fessenden of Maine,
provided that:
All provisions in the Constitution or laws of any State whereby
any distinction is made in political . . . rights or privileges on
account of race . . . or color shall be inoperative and void. 170
In contrast, the Blaine proposal stated that:
[W]henever the elective franchise shall be denied or abridged on
account of race . . . or color, all persons of such race . . . or color
shall be excluded from the basis of representation. 171
Looking at the text of the Fifteenth Amendment, it is clear that
Fessenden’s draft influenced the basis of that Amendment, 172 and
Blaine’s proposal is closest to the text adopted by the House as the basis
for section 2’s “indirectly coercive” method of protecting the
franchise. 173 The House favored this language because, unlike
Fessenden’s proposal, it would not disturb the states’ plenary authority
to choose the qualifications of electors. 174
Notwithstanding the potential federalism costs of the Fifteenth
Amendment, many of the Framers viewed it, standing alone, as applying
only to disenfranchisement on the three specified grounds (race, color, or
previous condition of servitude) and therefore inadequate to address the
ingenious ways in which states could potentially disenfranchise AfricanAmericans. 175 Indeed, the Framers had concerns that listing specified
170. Id. at 11.
171. Id. at 11–12.
172. The Fifteenth Amendment provides: “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.” U.S. CONST. amend. XV; see also MATHEWS, supra note 128, at 12 (“The
Fessenden plan, which involved the idea that finally took definite shape in the Fifteenth
Amendment, was intended to secure the right of suffrage to negroes by a direct guarantee.”); cf.
Chin, supra note 128, at 261 (overlooking the connection between the language of section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment and section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment).
173. MATHEWS, supra note 128, at 12 (“The Blaine plan . . . aimed at the same object [as the
Fessenden plan] by the indirectly coercive method of minatory inducements.”).
174. Id.; see also Zuckerman, supra note 151, at 97.
175. MATHEWS, supra note 128, at 45 (“Williams of Oregon thought that if a State should pass
disenfranchising legislation not based on any of the three specified grounds it would be valid
legislation as far as the Amendment was concerned. . . . The white people of a State might decide
that the negroes were disloyal, or were disturbers of the public peace, and on that account should not
be allowed to vote.”); see also id. at 46–47 (“Conkling of New York also considered the
Amendment utterly inadequate and ineffective on account of its omissions. One obvious method by
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grounds upon which a state may not disenfranchise in the Fifteenth
Amendment impliedly authorized a state to disenfranchise on other
grounds. 176 Yet this language of the Fifteenth Amendment, substantively
narrower but broader in the scope of available penalties than section 2 of
the Fourteenth, is consistent with the view that the states retained some
of their sovereignty over elections post-Reconstruction. 177 The Fifteenth
Amendment directly intruded on the ability of states to choose the
qualification of electors, but unlike the substantive provisions of section
2, it does not contain the broad language that prohibits states from
abridging the right to vote on almost any grounds. 178
Given this, the structure of section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
and section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment are best viewed as two halves
of a whole: under section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can
reduce representation for almost any abridgment whereas under section
1 of the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress could impose almost any
penalty for abridgment on three specified grounds. 179 The history of the
which it could be evaded, he said, was the full power which it allowed any State to provide by law
that ‘disingenuousness of birth’ [i.e., birth out of wedlock] should be deemed a disqualification to
exercise the right to vote.”). Other Framers believed that the use of proxies in and of themselves
could be discrimination based on race in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. See CONG. GLOBE,
41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3655 (1870) (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard) (noting that some courts may
construe the Fifteenth Amendment narrowly because it “forbids a certain thing to be done . . . and
that thing is denial or abridgment of the right to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude” and “[t]hat is all there is of it”).
176. See MATHEWS, supra note 128, at 45 (“To provide in the Constitution that the States should
not disenfranchise for the three specified causes [race, color, previous condition of servitude] was
impliedly to authorize them to disenfranchise for all other conceivable causes. Thus the Amendment
would operate as a virtual legalization of disfranchisement. Under it an aristocracy of property, of
intellect, or of sect might be established. Although the animus of the Amendment was a desire to
protect and enfranchise the colored people, yet it was anticipated that under it nine tenths of them
might be prevented from voting by the requirement on the part of the States of intelligence or
property qualifications.”). Arguably, this interpretation of the Fifteenth Amendment is avoided if it
is read in conjunction with section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, with its prohibition on
abridging the right to vote on grounds beyond race discrimination.
177. Some representatives pointed to section 2 as evidence that the states retained their authority
over the qualification of electors and therefore Congress could not prohibit states from altering their
state constitutions in order to disenfranchise African-Americans. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2606 (1868) (statement of Sen. John Henderson) (making this point); id. at 2665 (statement of
Sen. Roscoe Conkling) (same); infra text accompanying notes 194–98. But see CONG. GLOBE, 40th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2606 (1868) (statement of Sen. William Stewart) (denying that section 2 expressly
authorizes states to deny its citizens the right to vote).
178. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3665 (1870) (statement of Sen. Garrett Davis) (making
this point); see also id. app. at 472 (statement of Sen. Eugene Casserly) (noting that the Fifteenth
Amendment “is more limited in its language” than the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments).
179. See Chin, supra note 31, at 263 (conceding that “[s]ection 2 could still have an independent
role if it were construed to cover suffrage restrictions other than race” but concluding that it cannot
play this role because it has been narrowly construed by the courts). But see AMAR, supra note 85,
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Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments indicates that the Framers were
primarily concerned with expanding federal power while still retaining a
substantial amount of state sovereignty; 180 they were not trying to limit
their authority by replacing Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment with
Section 1 of the Fifteenth.
Congress passed the Fifteenth Amendment in order to provide
additional authority for direct intervention in state electoral processes for
several important practical and political reasons. 181 The first is the
recalcitrance of the ex-Confederates in denying African-Americans basic
rights, a state of affairs unlikely to be corrected through indirect
coercion. 182 Congress hoped, but could not guarantee, that the penalty of
reduced representation would induce states to extend the vote equally.
Second, the Fifteenth Amendment, in conjunction with the Fourteenth,
provided broad enforcement authority, allowing Congress to reinforce
the gains secured by the Military Reconstruction Act of 1867 and
prevent post-Reconstruction governments from altering their state
constitutions to abridge the right to vote on the basis of race. 183
Most important, the Fifteenth Amendment was less dependent on the
vagrancies of politics than section 2 of the Fourteenth. 184 Because of the

at 189 (arguing that section 2 creates an affirmative right to vote).
180. See, e.g., EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863–1869,
at 135 (1990) (noting that moderate and conservative Republicans endorsed a “constitutional
amendment dealing with suffrage [that] would admittedly be an infringement on states’ rights, but at
the same time, it could be a narrowly defined federal encroachment that would leave the balance of
power between the state and the federal governments otherwise unaltered”).
181. Congress passed the Fifteenth Amendment on February 26, 1869, and it was ratified by the
states on March 30, 1870, four years after the Fourteenth Amendment. MATHEWS, supra note 128,
at 34, 75.
182. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light from the Fifteenth, 74 NW. U. L.
REV. 311, 321–23 (1979).
183. There is a strong argument that, although the Military Reconstruction Act emerged from
Committee with the Fourteenth Amendment, the Act was likely unconstitutional. See David Currie,
The Reconstruction Congress, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 383, 412–14 (2008). However, the Fifteenth
Amendment arguably could prevent states from amending their Constitutions to discriminate in
voting on the basis of race.
184. See Paolo E. Coletta, The Democratic Party 1884–1910, in 2 HISTORY OF U.S. POLITICAL
PARTIES 987, 987 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. ed., 1973) (“Once the southern states were readmitted
to the Union, the Democrats staged a strong comeback, winning the House of Representatives in
1874, the popular vote for the presidency in 1876 and the Senate in 1878.”). The Republicans won a
huge victory in 1872, winning both the presidency and 196 of 281 congressional races that year, but
this win could be attributed to votes from the ex-slaves in the former confederacy. Indeed, the size
of the Republican victory masked a split in the party between prominent Republican leaders and
President Ulysses S. Grant over alleged corruption and economic policy that would ultimately lead
to huge losses for Republicans in the 1874 mid-term elections. See MICHAEL F. HOLT, BY ONE
VOTE: THE DISPUTED PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1876, at 17 (2008).
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politics of the time, implementation of section 2’s penalty depended on
both Houses of Congress having a Republican supermajority. After the
election of 1868, Congress realized that once the South was fully
integrated back into the union, the ex-confederates would move quickly
to abolish African-American suffrage despite the dictates of the
Fourteenth Amendment and restrictions in their state constitutions. 185
Congress could no longer unilaterally ensure the success of
Reconstruction. Thus, the political penalty of section 2 reflected
Congress’s distrust of the courts and the President in 1866, 186 whereas
the Fifteenth Amendment embraced Congress’s realization, by 1869,
that it may need the courts as well as additional sources of authority for
itself to continue Reconstruction.187
Although the Fifteenth Amendment arguably supplements Congress’s
authority under the Fourteenth, some scholars contend that the Fifteenth
Amendment repealed section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment upon its
adoption. 188 Admittedly, several moderate Republicans supported this
reading of section 2 during the debates over the Fifteenth
Amendment. 189 Similarly, George Boutwell and James G. Blaine,
writing about the Fourteenth Amendment almost two decades after its
adoption, argued that section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment repealed
section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 190 However, these Framers,

185. Republicans waited until after the election of 1868 to propose the Fifteenth Amendment, so
that it would not be an election year issue, but they believed the Amendment was necessary
because, as one scholar noted, “the attitude of southern whites left no doubt that if . . . no additional
warrant should exist for the further interference of Congress in the Southern States, negro suffrage
would be doomed.” MATHEWS, supra note 128, at 20–21.
186. See 6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 89
(1971) (“[The Reconstruction was a] dark period [when t]hose who lost in battle early sought
sanctuary in appeals to the Court; the portents it gave out were such as to bring upon it the menaces
of Congress. For a season, judicial authority was openly defied.”).
187. By 1869, the Republicans were only five years (or two elections) away from losing control
of the House of Representatives. Coletta, supra note 184, at 987. Even those Framers who believed
that the Fifteenth Amendment repealed section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment recognized that, at
the very least, the Fifteenth Amendment brought the courts back into the role of enforcer, but there
is no evidence that the Framers believed that the court was the only entity charged with playing this
role.
188. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 128, at 263 (“Section 2 is like the Fifteenth Amendment, except
that it covers fewer people, fewer elections, and offers more limited remedies. Lesser in every way,
Section 2 could never provide the rule of decision once the Fifteenth Amendment became law.”).
189. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2720 (1870) (statement of Sen. John Pool)
(arguing that the “necessity for [section 2] has since been entirely superseded by the fifteenth
amendment”).
190. See Chin, supra note 128, at 272–73 (discussing Representatives George Boutwell and
James Blaine).
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writing at a time when African-Americans had been disenfranchised in
the south despite the penalty of section 2, likely made this argument to
show that the burden had shifted from Congress to the courts to enforce
the Amendments. 191 Arguably, Boutwell and Blaine try to minimize
Congress’ impotence in the wake of clear constitutional violations by the
states in the decades following the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In addition, Boutwell argued at the time of the framing that
the Fifteenth Amendment was necessary because the Fourteenth
Amendment only limited the power of the states to abridge the right to
vote, not the power of the United States government; 192 this suggests
that his support for the repeal theory developed well after the framing of
the Amendments. Indeed, there is little evidence that the consensus view
was that, upon its adoption, the Fifteenth Amendment would supersede
or repeal section 2 of the Fourteenth.
Before the Joint Committee introduced the Fifteenth Amendment in
Congress in January 1869, there were proposals on the table that would
have prevented states from altering their state constitutions to
disenfranchise individuals or a class of persons. 193 The legislative history
surrounding these proposals offers significant evidence that very few
people actually believed section 2 was a dead letter upon the adoption of
the Fifteenth Amendment; in fact, opponents of the legislation pointed to
section 2 as evidence that states retained the authority to choose the
191. Compare GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE END
FIRST CENTURY 389 (1895) (“By virtue of the Fifteenth Amendment the last sentence of
Section two of the Fourteenth Amendment is inoperative wholly, for the Supreme Court of the
United States could not do otherwise than declare a State statute void which should disenfranchise
any of the citizens described.”), with CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 559 (1869) (statement of
Rep. George Boutwell) (reading section 1 and section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment together in
order to prohibit states from abridging the right to vote on the basis of race), and 2 JAMES G.
BLAINE, TWENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS 418–19 (1886) (“Before the adoption of the Fifteenth
Amendment, if a State should exclude the negro from suffrage the next step would be for Congress
to exclude the negro from the basis of apportionment. After the adoption of the Fifteenth
Amendment, if a state should exclude the negro from suffrage, the next step would be for the
Supreme Court to declare that the act was unconstitutional, and therefore null and void.”).
192. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 560 (1869) (statement of Rep. George Boutwell)
(“[T]there is no provision in the Constitution by which the United States is denied the power of
abridging the right of citizens to vote. There is, in the fourteenth article of amendments to the
Constitution, a limitation upon the power of the States in that respect, but none upon the power of
the United States. The amendment which we propose secures the people against any abridgment of
their electoral power, either by the United States or by the States. In that alone there is sufficient
reason to justify the amendment.”).
193. When Arkansas sought readmission back into the union, the following bill, for example, was
proposed as a condition of readmission: “That the constitution of Arkansas shall never be so
amended or changed as to deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the United States of the right to
vote.” CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2609 (1868) (statement of Sen. John Sherman).
OF THE
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qualification of electors and Congress could not prevent states from
altering their constitutions in matters of voting. 194
During these debates, supporters of the Fifteenth Amendment made
two interrelated arguments illustrating the continued validity of section
2. First, they argued that section 1 and section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, when viewed together, “declared [that] the State has no
right” to “abridge or deny to a citizen the right to vote.” 195 In other
words, “[b]y the second section there is a political penalty for doing that
which in the first section it is declared the State has no right to do,”
supporting the view that section 2 is still operative. 196 Second, these
proponents of the Fifteenth Amendment explicitly conceded the validity
of section 2, some framing it as a necessary stopgap measure designed to
penalize the states until Congress could intervene pursuant to its
authority under section 5, 197 while others took a more expansive view of
its provisions. 198 Thus, both proponents (including later supporters of the
repeal theory) and opponents of the Fifteenth Amendment assumed that
section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment would continue to be valid after
the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified.
Sectional politics also undermines arguments that section 2 of the

194. Id. at 2698 (statement of Sen. James Doolittle) (“The constitutional amendment [section 2]
thus expressly recognizes in, if it does not confer on, the States the power to disqualify persons from
exercising the right of suffrage on account of race or color, or any other reason they choose. The
only faculty which it attaches to a State doing so is that it shall be reduced proportionally in its
representation. And now for gentlemen to come in here with a bill which on the very face of it
insists first, that the State shall adopt the constitutional amendment which recognizes the right of the
State to fix for itself the qualification of voters, and then contains in the same bill a fundamental
provision that the State shall never exercise the right which your constitutional amendment gives, is
a monstrous piece of absurdity!”); see also CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 642, 644–45 (1869)
(statement of Rep. Charles Eldridge) (same); id. at 2741 (statement of Sen. Oliver Morton) (“[T]he
fourteenth article, the amendment of the Constitution, which we insist shall be made part of the
Constitution, distinctly recognizes that this power [to choose the qualifications of electors] does
belong to the States . . . .”)
195. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 559 (1869) (statement of Rep. George Boutwell); see
also id. (“If the right to vote for certain officers be denied or abridged, then certain political
consequences follow [under section 2]; but in the first section there is a distinct declaration this
cannot lawfully be done.”).
196. Id.
197. See id. (“It is here provided [in section 1] that there shall be no abridgment of the privileges
and immunities of citizens; and in the second section there is a penalty provided for a State that
disregards the inhibition . . . It was uncertain when Congress would exercise the power conferred by
the fifth section of the fourteenth amendment, and in order that the States should not take advantage
of their own wrong during the period while Congress might be inactive a penalty was provided.”).
198. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1625 (1869) (statement of Sen. Jacob
Howard) (arguing that Congress can grant the right to vote under section 2 through ordinary
legislation).
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Fourteenth Amendment and section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment either
have the same scope, or that the latter supersedes the former. 199 Many
northern states did not allow African-Americans to vote, but because this
group was such a small percentage of the population, there was not a
great deal of northern opposition to section 2. 200 In addition, Congress
broadened the scope of section 2 by eliminating the reference to race,
which allowed it to avoid accusations that it was trying to affirmatively
enfranchise African-Americans while indirectly trying to achieve that
goal. The Fifteenth Amendment, on the other hand, was politically
unfeasible at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted because
many feared its language would be construed as an affirmative guarantee
of the right to vote, thereby upsetting northern states. 201
Despite the different concerns underlying their respective adoptions,
post-enactment legislation suggests that congressional authority derived
from both Amendments, especially given the controversy over whether
Congress could regulate facially neutral state laws that had the effect,
but not the intent, of abridging the right to vote on the basis of race. 202
The Court did in fact invalidate such legislation in United States v.
Reese, 203 despite the fact that a collective assessment under both
Amendments would have rendered the Enforcement Act of 1870, which
broadly protected the right to vote from both discriminatory and neutral
abridgements, constitutionally valid.

199. See MATHEWS, supra note 128, at 17 (“If it had been possible to propose an amendment
similar in principle to the Fifteenth Amendment which could be made to apply only to the Southern
States, there is little doubt that it would have been done in 1866.”).
200. See id. at 13 (“There was no demand by either [political] party that the local autonomy of the
Northern States should be abridged by depriving them of the power to withhold suffrage from
negroes, yet this deprivation would be a necessary consequence of enacting a negro suffrage
amendment to the Constitution. Thus at the outset was encountered the difficulty of dealing with a
sectional problem by means of constitutional amendment, which, from its necessary generality in
operation, is apt to produce undesigned results.”).
201. See id. at 17 (“The extension of suffrage to negroes in 1866 by a direct constitutional
guarantee was prevented . . . by the opposition to such a measure encountered in the Northern
States.”).
202. See id. at 44–48; see also CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 421 (1870) (statement
of Sen. Joseph Fowler) (noting that the “second section [of the Fifteenth Amendment] may go
further [than the first section, but it] is a question of doubt whether any more power is conferred by
the auxiliary than by the primary”); CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 561 (1869) (statement of
Rep. George Boutwell) (conceding that nothing in the Fifteenth Amendment would prevent states
from requiring property or educational qualifications as a precondition to voting); supra text
accompanying note 175.
203. 92 U.S. 214, 221–22 (1875).
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The Enforcement Act of 1870 as a Model for Voting Rights
Legislation Under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments

Although most scholars believe that congressional authority under
section 2 is limited to the penalty listed in the provision, both the text of
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as post-enactment
legislation suggests that there is a more plausible reading available.
Throughout the congressional debates, several representatives argued
that that the enforcement clauses included authority to not only enforce
the substantive provisions of the Amendments on their terms, but also
legislate broadly to enforce their guarantees. For example, during the
debates over the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress discussed whether it
had authority under the Amendment to legislate with respect to the black
codes instituted throughout much of the South. 204 As Senator Sherman
observed:
Here is not only a guarantee of liberty to every inhabitant of the
United States, but an express grant of power to Congress to
secure this liberty by appropriate legislation. Now, unless a man
may be free without the right to sue and be sued, to plead and be
impleaded, to acquire and hold property, and to testify in a court
of justice, then Congress has the power, by the express terms of
this amendment, to secure all of these rights. 205
The consensus view in Congress seemed to be that the enforcement
clauses operated in a manner similar to the Necessary and Proper Clause
of article I, 206 a position endorsed by the Court in its pre-City of Boerne
case law. 207 Even John Bingham, the primary drafter of section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, sanctioned this idea, arguing that “adding an
amendment to the Constitution to operate on all the States of this Union
alike [will give] Congress the power to pass all laws necessary and
204. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 40–43 (1865) (statements of Sens. John Sherman,
Lyman Trumbull, and Henry Wilson).
205. Id. at 41 (statement of Sen. John Sherman); see also id. at 43 (statement of Sen. Lyman
Trumbull) (“The second clause of [the Thirteenth] amendment was inserted for some purpose, and I
would like to know of the Senator from Delaware for what purpose? Sir, for the purpose, and none
other, of preventing State Legislatures from enslaving, under any pretense, those whom the first
clause declared should be free. It was inserted expressly for the purpose of conferring upon
Congress authority by appropriate legislation to carry the first section into effect . . . . What that
‘appropriate legislation’ is, is for Congress to determine, and nobody else.”).
206. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3663 (1870) (statement of Sen. Allen
Thurman) (“[T]hat provision about appropriate legislation is nothing more than the old provision in
the Constitution which gives Congress power to pass all necessary and proper laws for carrying the
provisions of the Constitution into effect, and is to be interpreted in the same light.”).
207. See supra Part I.A.
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proper to secure to all persons . . . their equal personal rights.” 208
Similarly, other representatives believed that, with respect to voting
rights, Congress’s authority to legislate broadly was not limited to
addressing discrimination based on race. 209 Indeed, the Enforcement Act
of 1870, which Congress passed pursuant to its authority under the
Fifteenth Amendment, included language similar to section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment extended beyond discriminatory denials of the
ballot based solely on race. 210
The Enforcement Act of 1870 required that all citizens be able to vote
“at any election by the people in any State, Territory, district, county,
city, parish, township, school district, municipality, or other territorial
subdivision” without regard to “race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.” 211 Section 3 of the Act provided criminal penalties for “any
judge, inspector, or other officer of election whose duty it is or shall be
to . . . give effect to the vote of any such citizen who shall wrongfully
refuse [to] give effect to the vote of such citizen,” 212 and section 2
penalized any such person or officer for failing to “give to all citizens of
the United States the same and equal opportunity to perform such
prerequisite, and to become qualified to vote without distinction of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude.” 213 Notably, section 4 extended
this criminal penalty to “any person [who] by force, bribery, threats,
intimidation, or other unlawful means, shall hinder, delay, prevent, or
obstruct . . . any citizen from doing any act required to be done to qualify
him to vote or from voting at any election” but without the limitation
that the vote denial be based on race, color, or previous condition of
servitude. 214
Although most of the legislative debates surrounding the Enforcement
Act centered on Congress’s authority to “enforce” the provisions of the
Fifteenth Amendment, 215 the text of the Act, encompassing the
208. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1866) (statement of Rep. John Bingham).
209. See id. at 358 (statements of Reps. Roscoe Conkling and Andrew Rogers).
210. Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140.
211. Id. § 1.
212. Id. § 3.
213. Id. § 2.
214. Id. § 4.
215. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 473 (1870) (statement of Sen. Eugene
Casserly) (arguing that, if the Fifteenth Amendment reaches individuals, “it is only on those who are
officers, and hence the agents of the State”); id. at 355 (statement of Sen. William Hamilton)
(disputing that Congress can impose criminal penalties under the Fifteenth Amendment because
“the denial of the exercise of a certain power by the Constitution to a State does not thereby confer
upon Congress power over the subject-matter of such denial”).
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substantive protections of both section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
and section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment, reflects Congress’s aggregate
authority under the Amendments. While it is certainly possible that
section 4 of the Enforcement Act was poorly drafted, 216 the Supreme
Court could have endorsed a plausible reading of the Act that would
have given effect to the general purpose behind the Amendments:
Congress was enforcing the guarantees of both section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment (via section 5) and the Fifteenth Amendment in
order to protect not only voters, but differential treatment that
undermines the integrity of the ballot.
Indeed, the Supreme Court ignored that section 2 protects the right of
suffrage from abridgment, independent of the Fifteenth Amendment’s
protection of minority voters as a class, when it invalidated the
Enforcement Act on the grounds that the statute criminalized the actions
of state officials for any discriminatory denial of the ballot rather than
just race-based denials. 217 The Court reasoned that an elector could
prove a discriminatory denial of the ballot even if, for example, an
inspector of elections makes an honest mistake in denying the elector the
ballot. 218 Yet it makes no logical sense that Congress can, consistent
with section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, reduce a state’s
congressional representation for the same behavior, but cannot pass a
penalizing statute that would allow the inspector to prevail by showing
that the denial was in error. 219
Instead, the Court focused on whether the inspector would know that
his denial of the ballot was wrongful, absent the statute’s express
limitation to race. 220 This narrow focus is somewhat understandable,
given that Congress passed the statute under the Fifteenth Amendment,
but the language of section 2 allows Congress to penalize denials of the
ballot for reasons other than race. Since the Reese Court analyzed the
Fifteenth Amendment in isolation from the Fourteenth, it overlooked
216. Some representatives believed that section 4 of the Enforcement Act was limited to racebased denials, despite the absence of this language in the provision. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong.,
2d Sess. 3663 (1870) (statement of Sen. John Sherman) (arguing that the fourth section of the
Enforcement Act is “badly worded,” but the use of the word “‘aforesaid,’ referring to the previous
section, shows clearly enough that the intention of its framers was to confine the operation of that
section to offenses against the fifteenth amendment”).
217. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875); see id. at 219 (holding that section 4 of the
Act interfered with the state’s authority to choose the qualification of electors).
218. Id. at 220.
219. The Court could have achieved this result by construing the statute to require that the vote
denial be “willful” rather than just “wrongful.” See id.
220. Id.
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this key fact. Similarly, in United States v. Cruikshank, 221 the Court
dismissed the indictment against the defendant election inspectors
because it did not appear that “the intent of the defendants was to
prevent these parties from exercising their right to vote on account of
their race,” a conclusion that also assumes, contrary to section 2, that
Congress is limited to preventing denials of the ballot only on this
ground. 222
Given its broad authority under both Amendments, Congress could
have justified the Enforcement Act on the grounds that, if it can reduce
state representation for abridging the right to vote on any grounds in
both state and federal elections, it could also criminalize official
behavior that does the same. In order to achieve broad access to the
franchise, Congress had to have the power to employ a variety of means
to further the Fourteenth Amendment’s nondiscrimination principle.
Unfortunately, the Court’s failure to acknowledge both the text and
the historical connection between the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments also has led it to engage in an interpretive sleight of hand
to justify extensions of the VRA in the last four decades. 223 In reality, no
such subterfuge is required because the VRA continues to be a
constitutional exercise of congressional authority.
III. THE INTRATEXTUAL LEGACY OF THE FOURTEENTH
AND FIFTEENTH AMENDMENTS: ASSESSING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRECLEARANCE
An intratextual reading of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
as a matter of constitutional text, structure, and history illustrates that the
recent Supreme Court decision in Shelby County v. Holder was wrongly
decided. Section 2’s penalty of reduced representation serves as the
baseline from which to assess the constitutionality of voting rights
legislation passed pursuant to Congress’s enforcement authority;
selective preclearance arguably falls within the range of penalties that
Congress can adopt to “enforce” the Amendments. Nevertheless, in
221. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
222. Id. at 556; see also id. (“The right to vote in the States comes from the States; but the right
of exemption from the prohibited discrimination comes from the United States. The first has not
been granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States; but the last has been.”).
223. See NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193, 205, 211 (2009) (resolving the challenge to the bailout
mechanism of the VRA on questionable statutory grounds in order to avoid ruling on the
constitutionality of section 5); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966) (concluding that
the New York’s English literacy requirement for voters could discriminate against New York’s
large Puerto Rican community, but not requiring congressional findings that prove this proposition).
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NAMUDNO v. Holder and Shelby County v. Holder, respectively, the
Chief Justice expressed two points of concern with respect to the
constitutionality of section 5 of the VRA that are likely to be relevant in
any future litigation: (1) it imposes a preclearance requirement that
suspends all changes to a state’s election laws; 224 and (2) it treats
similarly situated sovereigns differently by requiring some states to
preclear changes to their election laws but not others. 225 I take each of
these arguments in turn.
A.

Preventing Circumvention Through the Overbreadth of
Preclearance

The analysis contained herein regarding the scope of congressional
authority, premised on the link between sections 2 and 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, can provide a sound constitutional justification
for the imposition of a preclearance regime that suspends all electionrelated changes. Preclearance is a lesser penalty than reducing a state’s
congressional delegation pursuant to section 2 because it is less intrusive
of state sovereignty. However, since states have to preclear changes that
regulate state elections and voter qualifications, preclearance falls closer
to the end of the regulatory spectrum where congressional power is at its
lowest ebb. 226
Notably, the legislative record of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments is clear that many state laws regulating access to the
franchise would not count as an abridgment within the context of section
2, yet these are the very laws that are required to be precleared under
section 5. 227 For example, many representatives in Congress believed
that imposing durational residency requirements is consistent with the
224. NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 202 (“Section 5 goes beyond the prohibition of the Fifteenth
Amendment by suspending all changes to state election law—however innocuous—until they have
been precleared by federal authorities in Washington, D.C. The preclearance requirement applies
broadly, and in particular to every political subdivision in a covered State, no matter how small.”
(citations omitted)); see also Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2626–27 (2013)
(describing section 5’s increased incursion on state sovereignty since its original enactment and
implying that the provision has constitutional problems independent of the coverage formula).
225. NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 203 (“The Act also differentiates between the States, despite our
historic tradition that all the States enjoy ‘equal sovereignty.’ Distinctions can be justified in some
cases. . . . But a departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing
that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”
(citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 16 (1960))).
226. Halberstam, supra note 29, at 948; see also supra Part I.B (discussing the spectrum of
congressional authority over elections).
227. I argue in a related piece that section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment would not, for
example, render voter identification laws per se unconstitutional. See Tolson, supra note 125.
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state’s authority over elections. 228 Some Framers also believed that
educational requirements and literacy tests are valid so long as they are
rational and both African-Americans and whites are subject to these
qualifications. 229 Indeed, John Bingham proposed a version of the
Fifteenth Amendment that would have created an affirmative right to
vote in which “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge or deny to any male citizen . . . the equal exercise . . . of the
elective franchise,” but subject to the citizen being male, of sound mind,
twenty-one years or older, a resident for at least a year, and most
notably, “subject to such registration laws as the State may establish.” 230
The Framers thus viewed many voting rights regulations as fairly
pedestrian and not per se unconstitutional under the Amendments. 231
Although the VRA required many regulations that did not raise
constitutional concerns to be precleared, this remedy prevented states
from implementing ostensibly neutral laws or taking other official
actions that had the effect of circumventing the protections of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 232 For example, states were often
more derelict in submitting changes that governed state and local
elections for preclearance than those that governed federal elections,233
many of which were later deemed to be discriminatory and denied
preclearance. Local governments have been some of the most brazen

228. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2609 (1868) (statement of Sen. John Sherman)
(arguing that Congress could not prevent voting restrictions “aimed at all persons who had not
resided within the State for a certain length of time”). This does not mean that suffrage
qualifications that are generally constitutional can never be invalidated if unreasonable or unrelated
to the franchise. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972) (invalidating a durational
residency requirement that did not adequately promote the state’s interest in preventing fraudulent
voting or having knowledgeable voters); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 358 (1866) (statement
of Rep. Roscoe Conkling) (noting that these regulations can violate the Fourteenth Amendment if
not applied to everyone equally).
229. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2701 (1868) (statement of Sen. John Henderson); id.
app. at 350 (statement of Sen. Richard Yates) (“Exclusions from suffrage for a time, and which
apply to all men alike, are allowable. If all men are excluded, men of all races, unless they are of
suitable age, from voting, I do not see anything which would conflict with its being a republican
form of government. Equality is the basis of a republican government.”).
230. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 728 (1869).
231. This does not mean that facially neutral laws that have a discriminatory effect were beyond
the purview of section 2. See Tolson, supra note 125.
232. The Framers were also concerned that states would use their authority over elections to
circumvent the protections of the Amendments. See supra text accompanying notes 146–47.
233. See Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 658–59 (1991) (holding that the state of Louisiana was
required to submit every judgeship created under state law for preclearance through the Department
of Justice, rather than sporadically submitting some judgeships for preclearance as had been the
state’s practice).
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violators of the Voting Rights Act, on occasion implementing
discriminatory laws that the Department of Justice has refused to
preclear under section 5. 234 Shelby County itself has shamelessly
violated section 5, notably when Calera, Alabama (located within the
county) held elections under a redistricting plan that the Department of
Justice refused to preclear because the city eliminated the only majorityminority district. 235 Limiting the preclearance regime to only federal
elections would not only allow violations such as these to slip through
the cracks, but also could have the foreseeable effect of deterring
minority voter turnout in all local, state, and federal elections.236
The anti-circumvention norm can resolve constitutional concerns that
might otherwise require a lopsided preclearance regime, as this norm has
justified the extension of federal authority into areas that are firmly
within the province of state power. In City of Rome v. United States, 237
for example, the Court observed that Congress can pass legislation under
section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment in order to prohibit acts that do
not violate section 1 of the Amendment, “so long as the prohibitions
attacking racial discrimination in voting are ‘appropriate,’ as that term is
defined in McCulloch v. Maryland.” 238 Similarly, in Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 239 the Court held that legislation enacted pursuant to section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment would be upheld “so long as the Court
could find that the enactment ‘is plainly adapted to [the] end’ of
enforcing the Equal Protection Clause and ‘is not prohibited by but is
consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution,’ regardless of
whether the practices outlawed by Congress in themselves violated the
234. See, e.g., Michael J. Pitts, Watch Out in the Covered Jurisdictions, REUTERS (Feb. 7, 2013),
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/02/07/watch-out-in-the-covered-jurisdictions/ (noting “a
disproportionate number of pre-clearance denials involved vote dilution on the local level” over the
past thirty years).
235. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2642 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice
Ginsburg also noted other examples of misconduct by state and local governments including the
cancellation of elections and early voting days to prevent the election of African-Americans in local
elections; the enactment of a voting scheme for a school board election that earlier had been
invalidated by a federal court; and voter purges that would have disqualified many voters from
participating in local elections. Id. at 2640–41.
236. See, e.g., Michelle Miller & Phil Hirschkorn, Voter ID Bill Raises Controversy in North
Carolina, CBS NEWS (Aug. 13, 2013, 5:22 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_16257595791/voter-id-bill-raises-controversy-in-north-carolina/ (discussing legislation in North
Carolina, which had been partially covered under section 5, that would roll back early voting,
impose a very strict voter identification law, outlaw Sunday voting, and repeal same day
registration).
237. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
238. Id. at 177.
239. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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Equal Protection Clause.” 240 In these cases, the Court recognized that its
interpretation regarding the breadth of congressional enforcement
authority makes it inevitable that some level of constitutional state action
will be deterred or affected, yet the risk that this state action will
undermine the protections of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
is paramount. 241
The Court’s willingness to allow Congress to regulate otherwiseconstitutional behavior and intrude on state sovereignty so as to prevent
constitutional violations has deep roots in the case law. For example, in a
series of decisions collectively known as the White Primary Cases, the
Supreme Court invalidated a succession of Texas laws that prohibited
African-American voters from participating in the Democratic Party’s
primary despite the fact that there was no direct state action that ran
afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment. 242 The Court rightly recognized that
African-Americans were being disenfranchised indirectly through the
state apparatus because the Democratic Party effectively controlled the
state government. Thus, in Smith v. Allwright,243 the Court held that,
although the “privilege of membership in a party may be . . . no concern
of a State,” when that “privilege is . . . the essential qualification for
voting in a primary to select nominees for a general election, the State
makes the action of the party the action of the State.” 244 In other words,
the Democratic Party could not rely on its First Amendment right of
association in order to exclude African-Americans because the party, in
choosing its nominees for office, was functioning as the state. The Court
found that the anti-circumvention norm justified abrogating the First
Amendment rights of a private association because the state was using
the Democratic Party to circumvent the protections of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. 245
240. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176 (1980) (quoting Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651).
241. See id. at 177 (holding that “Congress could rationally have concluded that, because
electoral changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimination in
voting create the risk of purposeful discrimination, it was proper to prohibit changes that have a
discriminatory impact” even though such changes do not violate the Constitution (footnote
omitted)).
242. The Court resolved the constitutionality of the all-white primary in a series of cases from
1927 to 1953. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935), overruled in part by Allwright, 321 U.S. 649; Nixon v.
Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
243. 321 U.S. 649.
244. Smith, 321 U.S. at 664–65; see also United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
245. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 653–54 (1998) (“Throughout the period of the White
Primary Cases, the Democratic Party had a complete monopoly on politics in Texas. Thus, when
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Similarly, the Court has invalidated government practices that burden
the right to vote but without requiring discriminatory intent like that
present in the White Primary Cases, an analytical leap justified by
concerns that states were undermining the protections of the
Amendments through indirect means. 246 In Harper v. Virginia State
Board of Elections, 247 for example, the Court invalidated the poll tax
because it bore no rational relationship to voter qualifications.248
Invidiousness was premised not on the presence of racially
discriminatory intent, but rather on the burden that the government
regulation placed on the right to vote without adequate justification. 249
In Harper, the Fourteenth Amendment functioned as a basis for
liability since voting is a fundamental right under the Equal Protection
Clause and the law burdened this right, and it also supplemented the
Fifteenth Amendment’s proscription against racial discrimination in
voting by focusing on one of the most obvious proxies for race:
wealth. 250 There was no evidence in the record that the poll tax had been
passed with discriminatory intent, but arguably the law had a
disproportionate effect on minorities in a way that offended the spirit of
the Fifteenth Amendment. 251 Despite the fact that the poll tax was a
longstanding historical practice, the Court invalidated it because the
country had turned a corner on civil rights with the passage of the
Voting Rights Act and the end of public school segregation in Brown v.
Board of Education; 252 most important, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment
eliminated the use of poll taxes for federal elections. 253 Allowing a poll

‘the State’ acted here, this was tantamount to the Democratic Party using state law to selfregulate.”).
246. But see Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372–73 (2001) (holding that
evidence of discriminatory impact is insufficient to justify the ADA’s abrogation of state sovereign
immunity).
247. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
248. Id. at 668.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.; cf. Cardona v. Power, 384 U.S. 672, 676 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that
New York denies equal protection by requiring voters to be literate in English). Arguably, the
problem with the English literacy requirement is that it has a disproportionate effect on Hispanics.
As Archibald Cox recognized, “No one could conscientiously make the a priori assertion that
English literacy bears no rational relationship whatever to ability to vote wisely in an election in
New York.” Archibald Cox, Forward: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human
Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 96 (1966).
252. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
253. Cox, supra note 251, at 96 (“The evidence of original intent is flatly inconsistent with the
theory that rich and poor must have an equal voice in elections. Originally, the ownership of
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tax for state elections would have circumvented the protections of the
Fifteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments, a justification that provided
the requisite links in the chain to justify the invalidation of a
longstanding historical practice under the Fourteenth Amendment. 254
The Voting Rights Act, in many ways, is of similar scope to the
Enforcement Act of 1870—extending beyond discriminatory denials of
the ballot—because of the sobering reality that the regime cannot
function just by focusing on federal elections, or alternatively,
discriminatory denials of the ballot. 255 The Court has ignored that
overbreadth is necessary, given that the state is responsible for enacting
regulations that govern both state and federal elections. 256 Redistricting,
in particular, illustrates the conflation of the regulatory apparatus
governing state and federal elections—one political party will
gerrymander both state legislative and congressional districts in order to
win more elections than the other party. 257 What states cannot
accomplish directly with respect to federal elections can be facilitated
through regulations that govern state elections if the preclearance regime
is divided. 258 Given that a disproportionate amount of preclearance
denials in recent years can be laid at the door of local governments, the
risk of circumvention is very real in this context, justifying the
preclearance remedy as it applies to state and local elections.

property was regarded as a highly relevant qualification for voting as a measure of responsibility
and material interest in government affairs. The poll tax itself was sanctioned by age, usage, and
legal precedent.”).
254. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), a Fifteenth Amendment case decided a few
years earlier than Harper, the Court inferred discriminatory intent from the twenty-eight-sided
figure that placed all African-Americans outside of the municipal boundaries of Tuskegee,
Alabama. Id. at 341, 347. Unlike Gomillion, there was no evidence of discriminatory intent present
in Harper, despite the racially discriminatory use of the poll tax in most southern states at the time.
255. The Voting Rights Act requires preclearance of any change to ensure that it has not been
used “for the purpose or with the effect” of making minorities worse off than under the prior rule.
Like the Enforcement Act of 1870, the VRA’s focus on intent and effect is designed to capture any
change, even the most innocuous, that could abridge the right to vote. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(b) (2006).
256. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (upholding the nationwide ban on literacy tests
even though Congress relied on its original findings that the tests were being used in a
discriminatory manner in the nine states in the deep south in extending the ban); cf. Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664–65 (1944) (recognizing the symbiotic relationship between the state
and the Democratic Party).
257. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 272 (2004); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes,
Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2313 (2006); Tolson, supra note 108,
at 863 (arguing that states can influence federal policy through their control over congressional
redistricting).
258. Cf. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 257, at 2313 (noting how the American system of
separation of powers is undermined by a similar dynamic because of political parties).
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New Coverage Formula?: Discriminatory Intent and the Fallacy of
Equal Sovereignty

Despite Congress’s interest in preventing behavior that could
circumvent the protections of the Amendments, it is questionable after
Shelby County if the presence of discriminatory effect—rather than
intent—is sufficient to justify voting rights legislation that distinguishes
between the sovereign states. 259 Indeed, one of the biggest landmines
facing the Voting Rights Act is that it basically has functioned since
1982 as an effects-based regime. Although section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment illustrates that the fit of voting rights legislation does not
have to be perfect, allowing for some over- and under-inclusiveness in
the coverage formula, application of the congruence-and-proportionality
test or, as the Court asserts in Shelby County, the basic guiding
principles of NAMUDNO, 260 still could result in the invalidation of both
section 5 and any newly devised formula designed to trigger coverage.
Section 5 liability is premised on retrogression, which asks whether
the proposed change has the purpose or effect of making minorities
worse off than under the prior law, and a claim under section 2 of the
VRA can be established by showing discriminatory effect as well.
Neither requires that the state act with discriminatory purpose in order to
face liability. 261 In cases invalidating legislation that exceeded the scope
of Congress’s authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Court has explicitly looked for a pattern of constitutional violations,
and some indication that the statute is operating to stop those
violations. 262 Yet the fact that effect, not intent, is at the heart of the
statute makes it unlikely that much of the conduct underlying a

259. Compare South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328–29 (1966) (“The doctrine of the
equality of States . . . applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to the Union, and not
to the remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared.”), with NAMUDNO, 557 U.S.
193, 203 (2009) (“[A] departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a
showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it
targets.”).
260. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2622 n.1 (2013) (stating that “Northwest
Austin guides our review under both Amendments in this case”).
261. Discriminatory purpose is sufficient but not necessary to deny preclearance under section 5.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006).
262. See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
639–40, 47 (1999) (holding that the Patent Remedy Act failed to meet the congruence-andproportionality test because “Congress identified no pattern of patent infringement by the States, let
alone a pattern of constitutional violations,” and because “it simply cannot be that ‘many of [the acts
of patent infringement] affected by the congressional enactment have a significant likelihood of
being unconstitutional’” (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997))).
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preclearance denial is unconstitutional. The focus on discriminatory
effect, rather than purpose, impacts the caliber of evidence that Congress
can amass in showing that section 5 of the VRA continues to be
needed. 263
Notably, it is the Court that decoupled discriminatory intent from the
retrogression analysis in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board. 264 In
Reno, the Court justified this move on the grounds that “[t]o deny
preclearance to a plan that is not retrogressive—no matter how
unconstitutional it may be—would risk leaving in effect a status quo that
is even worse”; it would “blur the distinction between [section] 2 and
[section] 5”; and most importantly, it would “exacerbate the ‘substantial’
federalism costs that the preclearance procedure already exacts,”
presumably by providing an alternative basis for preclearance denial. 265
In Shelby County, the Court pointed to Congress’s rejection of
Bossier Parish as further evidence of section 5’s potential
unconstitutionality; 266 what the Court overlooks, however, is that the
2006 amendments reintroduced the possibility of an intent analysis in the
context of preclearance, implicitly helping to build a record of violations
that would otherwise justify congressional action under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 267 Indeed, the Bossier Parish case contributed
to the constitutional problems that surround section 5 of the VRA
because it pushed the preclearance inquiry to focus solely on
retrogression, which essentially requires an effects analysis, 268 rather
than discriminatory purpose. The 2006 Amendments, allowing the
Department of Justice to deny preclearance because of either
discriminatory intent or retrogression, actually addressed one of the core
263. See Bertrall L. Ross II, The Representative Equality Principle: Disaggregating the Equal
Protection Intent Standard, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 175, 180 (2012) (noting that the VRA is
potentially unconstitutional because of the general “account of the Equal Protection Clause as
merely prohibiting intentional discrimination [which] suggests that congressional authority to enact
the Voting Rights Act is questionable, since the Act invalidates a whole host of state actions that
would be found constitutional under the intent standard”).
264. 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
265. Id. at 336.
266. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2627 (2013) (stating that allowing
preclearance denial based on discriminatory purpose would raise “the bar that covered jurisdictions
must clear” even though “conditions . . . have dramatically improved”).
267. Cf. Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 518 (D.D.C. 1982) (denying section 5 preclearance
to a Georgia redistricting plan that was nonretrogressive but had a discriminatory purpose). Indeed,
a district court recently found that the state of Texas engaged in intentional discrimination against
minority legislators and voters during the 2010–2011 round of redistricting. Texas v. United States,
887 F. Supp. 2d 133, 178 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2885 (2013).
268. See generally Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
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criticisms of the preclearance regime—its focus on discriminatory
effect—by tying preclearance to the constitutional standard of
intentional discrimination.
Nevertheless, the complexities of the VRA’s statutory scheme
negatively affect Congress’s ability to build a record showing a pattern
of constitutional violations; 269 instead, the record shows a series of
regulations, mostly constitutional, that make it more difficult for
minorities to vote or less likely that minorities can elect their candidate
of choice. 270 Using section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment as a baseline
reveals that these regulations, like those that are facially discriminatory
or passed with discriminatory intent, can lead to circumvention of the
constitutional protections of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
and therefore count as abridgments of the right to vote.
Section 2 analysis could also refute one of the key criticisms of the
coverage formula, namely that minority voter registration and turnout in
noncovered states parallels that in covered states, thereby undermining
the primary justification for singling out certain jurisdictions. 271 The
statute has two provisions that address concerns about the over- and
under-inclusiveness of the coverage and bailout procedures, 272
269. Compare Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008) (finding
Indiana’s voter identification law is constitutional), with Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 144
(D.D.C. 2012), vacated, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013) (denying preclearance to Texas’s voter
identification law under section 5 of the VRA).
270. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 875 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (relying on the higher
incidence of section 2 litigation in covered versus noncovered jurisdictions, rather than incidents of
intentional discrimination, in sustaining section 5 of the Voting Rights Act), rev’d, __U.S.__, 133 S.
Ct. 2612 (2013). Although Congress found that the majority of DOJ objections included findings of
discriminatory intent, Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), it is not clear that
these changes were made with discriminatory intent sufficient to violate the Constitution, see id. at
2629 (majority opinion).
271. The discussion of the coverage and bailout procedures here omits the potential concerns
raised by the partisan use of section 5, but I do not think that this is undermines the constitutionality
of the provision since partisanship does not violate the constitution in the same way that racial bias
does. Compare Daniel P. Tokaji, If It’s Broke, Fix It: Improving Voting Rights Act Preclearance, 49
HOW. L.J. 785, 830 (2006) (“[T]he argument for preclearance hinges on state and local governments
abusing their discretion based on racial bias, while the argument against preclearance hinges on the
federal government abusing its discretion based on partisan bias . . . the solution would seem to be
amending the preclearance process so as to curb the risk of partisan manipulation.” (emphasis in
original)), with Franita Tolson, Benign Partisanship, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 395 (2012)
(exploring the constitutional implications of the fact that partisanship violates the Constitution only
if used excessively).
272. See Michael P. McDonald, Who’s Covered? Coverage Formula and Bailout, in THE FUTURE
OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 255, 256 (David Epstein et al. eds., 2006) (“Congress recognized that
although many jurisdictions were appropriately covered, the coverage formula was to some extent
arbitrary—it did not even consider the percentage of minorities within a jurisdiction—and that it
might not cover all jurisdictions that discriminated or that it might capture jurisdictions that had not
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provisions that the Court did not pay significant attention to in
invalidating the coverage formula. 273 First, section 4(a) of the VRA
allows jurisdictions to obtain bailout if they have not used a test or
device “for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color.” 274 Second, section 3(c) permits
the federal courts to require preclearance for any noncovered
jurisdictions that violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. 275
Most covered jurisdictions have not been able to successfully bailout
from under the statute, 276 but the NAMUDNO Court addressed this
concern to some extent by broadening the bailout provisions of the
Act. 277 In addition, section 3(c) has always been a viable solution to the
problem of under-inclusiveness, a fact that the Court ignored in striking
down the coverage formula, but that has gained renewed attention in
recent months. 278
Given that the means-ends analysis of section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates a broad anti-circumvention norm, both the bail
out provision of section 4(a) and the bail in provision of section 3(c)
should have been a significant part of the analysis in determining “fit,”
particularly in light of the accuracy by which the formula actually
captures errant jurisdictions. Instead, the Court focused on the process
discriminated.”).
273. See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2628 (focusing on the government’s defense of the formula
as “reverse-engineered” rather than the sufficiency of provisions in the statute that address the
formula’s over and under inclusiveness).
274. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(d) (2006).
275. Id. § 1973a(c).
276. McDonald, supra note 272, at 261 (noting that after the amendment to the bailout formula in
1982, few jurisdictions have bailed out).
277. Tolson, supra note 8, at 1213 (“The Court expanded the scope of the bailout provisions in
order to allow NAMUDNO, which did not conduct voter registration, to bail out so as to avoid
ruling on the constitutional questions surrounding the preclearance provisions of section 5. Yet, had
the Court acknowledged that Congress has expansive power over elections, it would have
recognized that the constitutional problems did not emerge from an application of section 5 to the
utility district, but rather from the limited scope of section 4(a) in allowing the district to bail out.”);
see also Christopher B. Seaman, An Uncertain Future for Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The
Need for a Revised Bailout System, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 9, 46 (2010) (arguing that the
NAMUDNO Court found that the section 4(a) bailout satisfied both Katzenbach’s “more permissive
‘rational basis’ test” and City of Boerne’s “more stringent ‘congruence and proportionality’
standard”).
278. See, e.g., Defendant-Intervenors’ Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer and
Counterclaim, Texas v. Holder, No. 1:11-cv-1303 (D.D.C. 2013), available at
http://electionlawblog.org/wp-content/uploads/241-motion-sec-3redux.pdf (motion by defendantinterveners seeking leave to amend in order to have Texas bailed in under section 3(c) of the VRA
because of an earlier judicial finding that the state committed intentional discrimination in crafting
its 2011 redistricting plan).
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by which Congress developed the formula (“reverse-engineering”) rather
than the effectiveness of the preclearance regime itself in targeting bad
actors, an analysis that suggests that Congress could have imposed the
same formula that it developed in 1965 so long as the formula purposely,
rather than coincidentally, reflects current conditions. Under a
NAMUDNO/congruence-and-proportionality analysis, it ultimately does
not matter, from the Court’s perspective, that the trigger of section 4(b)
would capture the same states even if Congress had updated it in
2006. 279 Under a section 2 analysis, all of these factors—bail in, bail out,
effectiveness and accuracy of the coverage formula—would be relevant
in assessing how intrusive the preclearance regime is on state
sovereignty.
The Shelby County Court’s focus on the fact that Congress did not
develop the coverage formula in light of current conditions, rather than
the reality that voting discrimination still exists in the covered
jurisdictions, is a vast departure from prior precedent that focused
instead on reading the Act broad enough to effectuate the protections of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 280 In reality, Shelby County’s
reliance on the principle of state equality is a concept that has very little
legitimacy, as Congress often enacts legislation that treats states
differently. 281 Furthermore, the Constitution eschews a state-equality
principle by virtue of the way it structures the House and the Electoral
College, giving some states greater power on the national stage than
others. 282 Notably, the Framers initiated the penalty of section 2 with the
279. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2650 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the legislative record shows that “the formula accurately identifies the jurisdictions
with the worst conditions of voting discrimination”).
280. For example, in United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Alabama, 435 U.S.
110 (1978), the Court rejected the argument that political subdivisions that did not conduct
registration for voting were not covered by section 5 because this circumvented the purpose of the
statute. The Court reasoned that, in order for the VRA to be an effective remedial scheme that can
address abridgments of the right to vote on the basis of race in all contexts, it is plausible to extend
the Act’s protections to all jurisdictions within a covered state involved in electoral processes, even
if the jurisdiction itself did not conduct registration for voting. Id. at 117–18.
281. See Zachary S. Price, NAMUDNO’s Non-Existent Principle of State Equality, 88 N.Y.U. L.
REV. ONLINE 24, 27 (2013) (pointing to the Clean Air Act as an example in which, “under a rational
basis framework, Congress might properly choose . . . to permit one state to take the lead in setting
more stringent vehicle emissions standards, even if this choice is under-inclusive”).
282. See Joseph Fishkin, The Dignity of the South, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 175, 192 (2013)
(noting that “the Court should find a way to reason about [Shelby County] that avoids inscribing into
the Constitution a principle of . . . ’equal dignity’ of the states” because “the roots of such a
principle are to be found in the losing arguments of Reconstruction’s opponents”); Price, supra note
281, at 27 (“The text of the Constitution . . . implies the absence of a general principle of state
equality by mandating some forms of equal treatment but not others.”).
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intent that it apply selectively, penalizing those southern states with the
largest number of African-American voters while leaving the north
substantially untouched. 283 To say that Congress cannot pass legislation
singling out the worst offenders, a circumstance that should justify a
departure from this equality principle, would mean that Congress is
constitutionally obligated to pass legislation that is overbroad so as to
maintain this principle of state equality. Although overbreadth is
appropriate in certain circumstances, this argument not only strains
credulity, but also would run afoul of the Court’s own congruent-andproportionality standard. 284
Indeed, the most persuasive evidence justifying the coverage formula
is the fact that, as the lower court in Shelby County pointed out, there is
still meaningful evidence that discrimination is more widespread in
covered jurisdictions than in noncovered ones. Both the Shelby County
and NAMUDNO Courts focused on voter registration rates, finding that
“the racial gap in voter registration and turnout is lower in the States
originally covered by [section] 5 than it is nationwide.” 285 The district
court, in a finding supported by the court of appeals, instead pointed to
“several significant pieces of evidence suggesting that the 21st century
problem of voting discrimination remains more prevalent in those
jurisdictions that have historically been subject to the preclearance
requirement”—including the disproportionate number of successful suits
under section 2 of the VRA in covered jurisdictions and the “continued
prevalence of voting discrimination in covered jurisdictions
notwithstanding the considerable deterrent effect of [s]ection 5.” 286 In
283. See supra Part II.
284. This is precisely why suggestions that preclearance be extended nationwide would only
exacerbate, rather than fix, the constitutional issues surrounding section 5. See Fishkin, supra note
282, at 193 (“[T]o apply an equal dignity of the states principle in Shelby County . . . would be to
assert that the one salient difference in circumstances among the states that the Constitution requires
Congress to ignore is the fact that certain states recently spent most of a century openly defying the
Reconstruction Amendments . . . .” (emphasis in original)); cf. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2626–27
(chastising Congress for broadening the scope of section 5 in 2006 despite the Court’s warning that
it could undermine the provision’s constitutionality).
285. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2626 (comparing voter registration numbers in the six originally
covered states in 1965 and 2004); NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193, 203–04 (2009).
286. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 857 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct.
2612 (2013); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Uphold Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, NAT’L L.J.
(Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202589186037&slreturn=
20130122180432 (noting one study that “found that covered jurisdictions have only 25 percent of
the country’s population, but account for 56 percent of the successful suits under Section 2” and
another study, “which included published and unpublished decisions, found that 81 percent of all
successful Section 2 cases were in the covered jurisdictions even though they only hold 25 percent
of the nation’s population”).
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addition, a recent study has documented that the levels of racial bloc
voting in covered jurisdictions is not only higher than noncovered
jurisdictions, but has increased over the past decade. 287 Incorporating
section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment into the analysis, with its very
low threshold for violations to trigger congressional enforcement efforts,
reveals that this evidence is more than sufficient to validate Congress’s
decision to reauthorize the VRA’s preclearance and coverage
mechanism. 288
CONCLUSION
Sixteen years ago, the Supreme Court pointed to the Voting Rights
Act as the paradigmatic example of a remedial scheme appropriately
tailored to address harmful discrimination in voting. In Shelby County v.
Holder, the Court backtracked on this position, finding that the
preclearance regime lacks the same constitutional foundation that existed
when the Act was first passed in 1965.
The Court’s decision to invalidate the coverage formula of section
4(b) rather than the preclearance regime in its entirety leaves the door
open for further litigation should Congress choose to pass a new
coverage formula, or alternatively, if the Department of Justice increases
its use of the section 3(c) bail in mechanism, which also has its own
preclearance regime. This Article addresses these concerns by engaging
in a structural reading of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
premised on section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which illustrates
that Congress has broad authority to impose the remedy of preclearance.
This reading reveals that City of Boerne’s congruence-and287. Stephen Ansolebehere, Nathaniel Persily & Charles Stewart III, Regional Differences in
Racial Polarization in the 2012 Presidential Election: Implications for the Constitutionality of
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 205, 210 (2013) (arguing that “racial
polarization is higher, on average, in the covered areas than the noncovered areas” and “the extent
of racial polarization in presidential elections increased over the past decade” (emphasis in
original)).
288. Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J.
174, 193–94 (2007) (“To prove [section 5] was necessary, the best evidence would be data
concerning the extent of voting rights violations in the covered jurisdictions, especially if such
violations were more prevalent in covered than in noncovered jurisdictions. However, if the Act was
working well, then few such examples should exist. Conversely, if widespread voting rights
violations continued in the covered jurisdictions, then the law arguably was not working, and it
would be difficult to justify it as a congruent and proportional remedy.”). See generally Paul Winke,
Why the Preclearance and Bailout Provisions of the Voting Rights Act are Still a Constitutionally
Proportional Remedy, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 69 (2003) (noting that discrimination in
voting, and in particular the presence of racial bloc voting, make section 5 congruent and
proportional).
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proportionality standard as well as the “guiding principles” of
NAMUDNO that the Court relied on in Shelby County have to be
interpreted in light of section 2’s broad scope and extreme penalty.
The legislative debates over section 2 illustrate Congress’s attempt to
preserve some remnant of the pre-Civil War understanding of state
sovereignty over elections—illustrated by the lack of a positive right of
suffrage—while embracing increased federal power in this area during
Reconstruction. Because of this balancing between state sovereignty and
congressional power, section 2 represents the proper baseline from
which to assess voting rights legislation enacted pursuant to section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Contrary to Shelby County, the VRA’s
preclearance regime is constitutional in its entirety because it is
consistent with the fit of section 2; in other words, selective preclearance
is less intrusive of state sovereignty than reducing a state’s congressional
delegation. The imposition of lesser penalties both respects the original
framework of section 2 while recognizing that Congress, pursuant to
section 5, has enforcement discretion with respect to all of the provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Future litigation over the
constitutionality of preclearance as a remedy, which is highly likely
given all that remains unresolved following the Shelby County decision,
has to account for section 2 and its influence on the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments in order to fully illuminate the scope of
congressional authority over elections.

